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Prosecutorial discretion exists throughout the criminal justice system but plays a
particularly significant role for environmental crime. Congress made few distinctions
under the environmental laws between acts that could result in criminal, civil, or admin-
istrative enforcement. As a result, there has been uncertainty about which environmen-
tal violations will result in criminal enforcement and persistent claims about the over-
criminalization of environmental violations. To address these concerns — and to deline-
ate an appropriate role for criminal enforcement in the environmental regulatory
scheme — I have proposed that prosecutors should reserve criminal enforcement for
violations that involve one or more of the following aggravating factors: (1) significant
environmental harm or public health effects; (2) deceptive or misleading conduct; (3)
operating outside the regulatory system; or (4) repetitive violations. By doing so, prose-
cutors can focus on violations that undermine pollution prevention efforts and avoid
targeting defendants acting in good faith or those who commit technical violations of
the law. This Article presents the results of an empirical study to determine how often
those factors were present in cases investigated by EPA that resulted in criminal
charges from 2005–2010. My empirical research demonstrates that prosecutors
charged violations involving these aggravating factors for nearly every defendant pros-
ecuted over a six-year period. Indeed, most defendants engaged in conduct that involved
multiple aggravating factors. These findings suggest that prosecutors are exercising
their discretion reasonably under the environmental laws and provide empirical evi-
dence that should inform our understanding of the role of criminal enforcement and
lessen concerns about over-criminalization.
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INTRODUCTION
In January 1991, just four weeks after joining the Justice Department’s
Environmental Crimes Section as an entry-level attorney, I traveled to New
Orleans to attend an environmental enforcement conference. The conference
was attended by hundreds of criminal prosecutors and civil attorneys from the
Justice Department, as well as enforcement officials from the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”). It was a propitious time for environmental protec-
tion efforts in the United States. Less than two months earlier, President George
H. W. Bush had signed the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,1 culminating a
remarkable twenty-year period that created the modern environmental law sys-
tem in the United States.2 My new office, although only three years old, was
1 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2584, 2584–85
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2006)).
2 See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 69–73 (2004). The moment
would prove fleeting: Congress has not enacted any major environmental laws since 1990. See
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leading the prosecution of Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping for the Ex-
xon Valdez oil spill,3 which would result in the largest fines imposed for envi-
ronmental crime until the criminal prosecutions of BP and Transocean for the
Gulf oil spill during 2012 and 2013.4
Attorney General Richard “Dick” Thornburgh delivered the keynote ad-
dress at the 1991 Environmental Law Conference,5 which was an encouraging
show of support for environmental enforcement efforts from the perspective of
a newly minted environmental crimes prosecutor. The Attorney General her-
alded the Administration’s commitment to environmental protection and de-
cried environmental crime with sweeping rhetorical flourish, describing its
perpetrators as:
offenders who do some of the dirtiest work ever done to human
health and the quality of life. They illicitly trade in sludge, refuse,
waste, and other pollutants, and they pursue their noxious conceal-
ments only for the sake of gain. Everywhere — on our land, in our
water, even in the air we breathe — they leave their touch of filth.6
In the Attorney General’s formulation, environmental criminals were “dirty
white-collar criminals” who scarred precious natural resources, lied about their
misconduct, and did so for pecuniary gain. On this account, there could be little
question about which environmental violations warranted criminal prosecution.
These violations caused great harm (“some of the dirtiest work ever done to
human health and the environment”) and were committed by dishonest defend-
ants motivated by greed (“they pursue their noxious concealments only for the
sake of gain”).
Later the same day, the conference featured a panel discussion entitled
“What Makes An Environmental Case Criminal?” At the time, I thought this
could not be a serious question when confronting the filth, deceit, and greed
David M. Uhlmann, The Quest for a Sustainable Future, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 9
(2012).
3 Superseding Indictment, United States v. Exxon Shipping Co., No. 90-CR-00015 (D. Alaska
1991).
4 Exxon Shipping was sentenced to pay a fine of $125 million. Exxon Corporation was sentenced
to pay a fine of $25 million, but $125 million of the total fine amount was remitted as restitution.
Those fine amounts were not exceeded until the Justice Department entered plea agreements with
BP in November 2012 (recommending a $4 billion criminal penalty) and Transocean in January
2013 (recommending a $400 million criminal penalty) for causing the Gulf oil spill. Clifford
Krauss & John Schwartz, BP Will Plead Guilty and Pay Over $4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15,
2012), available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0zc8TkxGmTg/; John Schwartz, Rig Owner Will
Settle With U.S. in Gulf Spill, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013), http://perma.law.harvard.edu/
0Wwz1QT1WLz/; see generally David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico,
Environmental Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413 (2011) (predicting that the
Gulf oil spill would result in the largest criminal fines ever imposed under the environmental laws
and would shape public perceptions of environmental crime despite the fact that environmental
prosecutions based on negligence are anomalous and may raise questions about the role of envi-
ronmental criminal enforcement).
5 Richard Thornburgh, U.S. Att’y Gen., Keynote Address at the 1991 Environmental Law Enforce-
ment Conference: Our Blue Planet, A Law Enforcement Challenge (Jan. 8, 1991), available at
http://perma.cc/0zeAcJKtiru/.
6 Id. at 11, 12.
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excoriated by the country’s top law enforcement official in his keynote address.
If corporations and individuals were ravaging the Earth for monetary gain and
hiding their dirty deeds with deceptive conduct like midnight dumping and
doctored records, their violations would be criminal and should result in
prosecution.
Yet, as I would learn at the 1991 conference and in the years to follow, the
Attorney General was describing the easy cases, at least in terms of which
violations should be prosecuted criminally. The environmental laws create a
complex regulatory system affecting a wide range of economic activity in the
United States.7 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) es-
tablishes a cradle-to-grave regulatory scheme for hazardous wastes; the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”) regulates all discharges of pollutants into waters of the
United States; and the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) imposes limits on all air pollu-
tants that could endanger public health and welfare.8 As with any complex reg-
ulatory scheme, there are significant disparities in the seriousness of
environmental violations. Some involve devastating pollution, evacuation of
communities, or deliberate efforts to mislead regulators. Others may be de
minimis violations or isolated events that occur notwithstanding a robust com-
pliance program.
Given the wide range of potential environmental violations, it might have
been preferable for Congress to specify which environmental violations could
result in criminal prosecution.9 Instead, as I have noted elsewhere, Congress
made only limited distinctions between acts that could result in criminal, civil,
or administrative enforcement.10 Even the most technical violation of the envi-
ronmental laws theoretically could result in criminal prosecution if the defen-
dant acted with the mental state specified by the statute.11 Mental state is not
required for civil or administrative violations, but the additional proof required
for criminal prosecution often does little to differentiate between criminal, civil,
and administrative violations. In most cases, the government must show only
that the defendant acted knowingly. In other words, the government must show
defendants know they are engaging in the conduct that is a violation of the law;
the government is not required to show that defendants know they are breaking
the environmental laws.12 Indeed, in some cases, the government is required to
7 See Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection Into Legal Rules and the Prob-
lem with Environmental Crime, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 867 (1994).
8 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012); Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2012).
9 See David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: The Evolution of Criminal En-
forcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1223, 1228, 1242 (2009)
(discussing the criminalization of environmental violations, the limited distinctions between crimi-
nal and civil environmental violations, and the role of prosecutorial discretion in delineating an
appropriate role for criminal enforcement under the environmental laws).
10 Id. at 1242.
11 Id. at 1243.
12 See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 665–68 (4th Cir. 2007) (CWA violations);
United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961, 965, 967 (2d. Cir. 1993) (RCRA violations); United States
v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 88 (6th Cir. 1991) (CAA violations); Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1235–39 R
(discussing the knowledge requirement).
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prove only that the defendant acted negligently; in other cases, the government
is not required to show any mental state at all.13
If the same violation often could give rise to criminal, civil, or administra-
tive enforcement — and if mental state requirements only preclude criminal
enforcement for a small subset of violations — what determines which envi-
ronmental violations result in criminal prosecution? The answer is the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion, which exists in all areas of the criminal law, but
assumes a particularly critical role in environmental cases because so much
conduct falls within the criminal provisions of the environmental laws. Critics
of environmental criminal enforcement argue that Congress gave too much dis-
cretion to prosecutors or, even worse from their perspective, to EPA enforce-
ment officials.14 They note that whether a case is prosecuted criminally may be
determined by nothing more substantive than whether the case originates with a
criminal investigator or with one of their civil or administrative counterparts
within the Agency.15 Even supporters of criminal enforcement acknowledge
that prosecutorial discretion is broad under the environmental laws.16 But they
insist that it is no greater than in other areas of economic or regulatory crime
and that Congress properly relied on the good sense of prosecutors, the wisdom
of judges, and the judgment of juries to determine when violators of the envi-
ronmental laws should be convicted of criminal activity.17
I see no merit in debating whether prosecutorial discretion is broad under
the environmental laws — it clearly is — and I concede that it may be disquiet-
ing in a nation predicated on the rule of law that we depend so much on indi-
vidual prosecutors to determine what conduct should be criminally prosecuted.
I also acknowledge that the extent of prosecutorial discretion under the envi-
ronmental laws may raise uncertainty in the regulated community about which
environmental violations will result in criminal prosecution. On the other hand,
our criminal justice system always relies to some degree upon the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion to determine which violations will be prosecuted crimi-
13 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (2012) (misdemeanor violation of CWA for negligence); 16
U.S.C. § 707(a) (2012) (misdemeanor violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act based on strict
liability).
14 See Keith A. Onsdorff & James M. Mesnard, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in
RCRA Criminal Enforcement: What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10099,
10104 (1992); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on
the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 210–13 (1991)
(objecting to the alleged “diminution of mens rea” by environmental statutes); see also Kevin A.
Gaynor et al., Environmental Criminal Prosecutions: Simple Fixes for a Flawed System, 3 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11–12 (1992).
15 Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental Criminal
Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 900, 913–14 (1991); Uhlmann,
supra note 9, at 1243. R
16 See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, The Rhetoric of Environmental Crime: Culpability, Discretion,
and Structural Reform, 84 IOWA L. REV. 115, 127 (1998).
17 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943) (relying on strict liability tethered to
“the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of
juries”); Brickey, supra note 16, at 127; Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1244. R
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nally.18 To evaluate whether prosecutors have too much discretion — and to
address claims that the environmental laws criminalize too much conduct —
we need to know more about the circumstances under which environmental
prosecutors exercise their discretion to seek criminal charges for violations.
As a general matter, our understanding of prosecutorial discretion is lim-
ited, both because it is broad and unreviewable and also because prosecutors
are never required to state publicly what factors prompted them to pursue crim-
inal charges.19 Of course, prosecutors should only bring charges if there is suffi-
cient evidence to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
But the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, particularly in the federal system
where most environmental crimes are prosecuted, involves more than a rote
analysis of whether the law and the facts allow prosecution. Prosecutors have
limited resources and want to reserve criminal prosecution for cases that have
jury appeal and advance the prosecutor’s obligation to do justice.20 Whether a
case has these attributes often depends upon the presence of aggravating factors
beyond statutory elements.
For environmental crimes, I have written that prosecutors should exercise
their discretion to reserve criminal enforcement for cases with one or more of
the following aggravating factors: (1) significant environmental harm or public
health effects; (2) deceptive or misleading conduct; (3) operating outside the
regulatory system; or (4) repetitive violations.21 Limiting criminal enforcement
to cases with one or more of these aggravating factors would preclude prosecu-
tion for technical or de minimis violations and provide greater clarity about
which environmental violations might result in criminal charges. The presence
of one or more of these factors also would delineate an appropriate role for
criminal prosecution in the environmental regulatory scheme by limiting crimi-
nal prosecution to cases involving substantial harm or risk of harm or to cases
in which the conduct involves the type of deliberate misconduct we consider
criminal in other contexts as well.22
My views about prosecutorial discretion for environmental crime draw on
my experience serving for seventeen years as a federal environmental crimes
prosecutor, including seven as Chief of the Environmental Crimes Section
when I was responsible for approving all charging decisions in cases brought
by my office. The factors track what EPA has identified as significant in its
exercise of investigative discretion23 and draw from the Principles of Federal
18 Brickey, supra note 16, at 126–27; see also David A. Barker, Note, Environmental Crimes, R
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Civil/Criminal Line, 88 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1420–21 (2002)
(stating that broad prosecutorial discretion is “quite typical of criminal law” and may be less
objectionable in the context of environmental crimes, “where most defendants will be quite capa-
bly represented”).
19 See generally James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521 (1981).
20 Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1234, 1245. R
21 Id. at 1246–52.
22 Id. at 1226–27, 1245–52.
23 Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Dir., Office of Criminal Enforcement, EPA, to All EPA
Employees Working in or in Support of the Criminal Enforcement Program 3–5 (Jan. 12, 1994)
(finding that investigative discretion should be driven by (1) significant environmental harm and
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Prosecution that govern all criminal cases brought by the Justice Department.24
But my former office does not handle all cases prosecuted under the federal
environmental laws25 — the remainder are prosecuted by United States Attor-
neys — and the office does not require the presence of any specific aggravating
factors to justify criminal charges. As a result, in my prior scholarship, I could
not show the extent to which my normative model is descriptive as well.
I therefore created the Environmental Crimes Project to analyze the extent
to which the aggravating factors I had identified as normatively desirable were
present in recent prosecutions. Over a three-year period, with research assis-
tance from 120 students at the University of Michigan Law School,26 we re-
viewed all cases investigated by EPA from 2005–2010.27 To ensure a
representative dataset, we focused on defendants charged in federal court with
pollution crime or related Title 18 offenses.28 We conducted our review based
on court documents for over 600 cases involving nearly 900 defendants.29 In
addition to analyzing the aggravating factors, we also compiled data regarding
the types of defendants charged, the judicial districts and EPA regions involved,
the statutes charged, and the outcomes of the cases. In the process, we devel-
oped a comprehensive database of information about pollution cases investi-
gated by EPA from 2005–2010 that resulted in federal criminal charges.30
Based on our research, I have determined that one or more aggravating
factors were present in 96% of environmental criminal prosecutions from
2005–2010. This finding supports at least two significant conclusions. First, in
exercising their discretion to bring criminal charges, prosecutors almost always
(2) culpable conduct, defined as, among other things, repeated violations, deliberate misconduct,
concealment or falsification, and operating without a permit).
24
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.000 (1997) [hereinafter USAM].
25 See id. § 5-11.104 (updated in 2008) (describing the “Responsibility for Case Development and
Prosecution” and when cases should be handled by U.S. Attorneys, the Environmental Crimes
Section, and when jointly); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Criminal Enforcement of Pollution Control
Laws, 9 ENVTL. LAW. 1, 12–13 (Sept. 2002).
26 Most students who worked on the Project became eligible to receive a certificate upon gradua-
tion for completing the University of Michigan Law School’s pro bono pledge; some worked on
the Project during the summer and received a research stipend. I would like to thank all of the
students who worked on the Environmental Crimes Project and made this effort possible. The
names of the students are listed in Appendix A to this Article.
27 The 2005–2010 time period provided several years of data and hundreds of defendants to ensure
a representative dataset. I chose to begin with calendar year 2005 because that coincided with the
year that EPA began using an internal data management system called CrimDoc, which Agency
officials stated would provide EPA’s most complete and accurate information about criminal
prosecutions.
28 We limited our review to federal cases involving pollution crime because those are the primary
focus of EPA’s criminal enforcement program. EPA special agents also provide investigative sup-
port for state criminal cases, but only in a subset of all state cases. Likewise, EPA sometimes
works on cases involving wildlife crime, but most of those matters are investigated by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service. See infra Part II.
29 Our database includes 664 cases as determined by district court case numbers, which may in-
clude multiple defendants charged together. EPA codes for related cases, since not all related
defendants are charged together; that approach lowers the number to 506.
30 EPA maintains a website of criminal cases handled by the Agency. Summary of Criminal Prose-
cutions, EPA, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0N7SKfbn4rj/. The EPA website is a valuable resource
but does not include case documents or the quantitative and qualitative analysis that we conducted
in developing the Environmental Crimes Project.
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focus on violations that include one or more of the aggravating factors I have
identified. Second, violations that do not include one of those aggravating fac-
tors are not likely to be prosecuted criminally. I cannot say whether these ag-
gravating factors will trigger criminal prosecution; declined cases are not
public, so we do not have a control group of cases where prosecutors decided
not to pursue criminal charges. Nor could we create a comparison group of civil
matters, because civil cases involve notice pleading and most are resolved by
consent decrees that do not identify whether there were aggravating factors.
Indeed, I would expect that civil and administrative cases also involve at least
significant harm and repetitive violations (deceptive or misleading conduct, in
my experience, is likely to result in a referral for criminal enforcement). None-
theless, my finding that criminal enforcement is reserved for cases involving at
least one of the aggravating factors I have identified should provide greater
clarity about the role of environmental criminal enforcement and reduce uncer-
tainty in the regulated community about which environmental violations might
lead to criminal charges.
Part I of this Article discusses in greater detail the issues that prompted the
creation of the Environmental Crimes Project, namely the breadth of the statu-
tory definition of environmental crime, the resulting vagaries of the criminal
enforcement program, and our limited empirical understanding of prosecutorial
discretion. Part II outlines the methodology that we used to create the Project,
describes the types of information accumulated in the database, and explains
how we analyzed the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Part III presents
quantitative data about the statutes charged and violations involved in environ-
mental prosecutions. Part IV focuses on the presence or absence of the individ-
ual aggravating factors in each case. Part V analyzes how often multiple
aggravating factors are present, explores the relationship between the statutes
charged and the aggravating factors, and assesses defendants with no aggravat-
ing factors. Part VI concludes that criminal enforcement has been reserved for
violations with the aggravating factors I have identified and, while noting areas
for caution, suggests that prosecutors have exercised their discretion in ways
that should ameliorate concerns about over-criminalization.
I. THE ROLE OF CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATORY SCHEME
When should violations of the environmental laws expose perpetrators to
criminal sanctions, including possible jail time for individual defendants? It is
easy to answer this question by providing specific examples, such as midnight
dumping, bypassing pollution controls, tampering with monitoring equipment,
and lying on reports to the government in order to conceal illegal pollution. Yet,
because of the broad statutory definition of environmental crime and uncer-
tainty about how prosecutorial discretion is exercised under the environmental
laws, a clear understanding of the role of environmental criminal enforcement
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has eluded scholars and practitioners since the enactment and amendment of
our environmental laws during the 1970s and 1980s.
This Part begins with an explanation of why such a seemingly straightfor-
ward question would persist for three decades of criminal enforcement under
the environmental laws. I then address how uncertainty about the role of crimi-
nal enforcement has affected the evolution of the environmental crimes pro-
gram and identify distinctive qualities of environmental criminal enforcement
that may be attributable, at least in part, to ambiguity about when criminal
enforcement is appropriate. I also review prior empirical efforts analyzing envi-
ronmental crime and the extent to which those scholarly efforts have helped
create greater understanding of the field while leaving fundamental existential
questions unanswered.
A. The Expansive Definition of Environmental Crime
Environmental crimes are no different than other crimes. They require
proof that the defendant committed a prohibited act (the actus reus, or act re-
quirement) and did so with the requisite intent (the mens rea, or mental state
requirement).31 Congress therefore has two ways to define criminal conduct
under the environmental laws, just as it does for other areas of the law. First,
Congress can specify the acts or types of violations that are egregious enough
to warrant the moral and social opprobrium of criminal prosecution. Second,
Congress can specify the mental state or level of intent that a defendant must
possess to be held criminally responsible.
With regard to the act requirement, Congress identified some of the con-
duct that it viewed as criminal when it included criminal provisions in each of
the major environmental laws. For example, Congress included language in the
CWA, RCRA, and the CAA making it a crime to knowingly make false state-
ments in documents required under the relevant law and any implementing reg-
ulations.32 Congress included similar language that prohibited tampering with
or rendering inaccurate required monitoring methods under the environmental
laws.33
31 See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 103 (6th ed. 2008).
32 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4) (2012) (“knowingly makes any false material statement, representation,
or certification in any application, record, report, plan, or other document filed or required to be
maintained [under the CWA]. . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3) (2012) (“knowingly omits material
information or makes any false material statement or representation in any application, label,
manifest, record, report, permit, or other document filed, maintained, or used for purposes of
compliance [with RCRA]. . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2)(A) (2012) (“knowingly makes any false
material statement, representation, or certification in, or omits material information from, or
knowingly alters, conceals, or fails to file or maintain any notice, application, record, report, plan,
or other document required [by the CWA] . . . .”).
33 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4) (“knowingly falsifies, tampers with, or renders inaccurate any monitor-
ing device or method required to be maintained under [the CWA]. . . .”); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(c)(2)(C)  (“knowingly . . . falsifies, tampers with, renders inaccurate, or fails to install any
monitoring device or method required to be maintained or followed under [the CAA]. . . .”).
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Congress also made clear that failure to obtain permits for the disposal of
hazardous waste, the discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States,
and the construction of new stationary sources of air pollution could give rise to
criminal liability, as could violations of permits issued pursuant to the environ-
mental laws.34 Congress provided enhanced penalties for environmental viola-
tions that placed others in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.35
In each of these ways, Congress took meaningful steps to define which viola-
tions of the environmental laws are criminal.
In other ways, however, Congress did not distinguish criminal violations
of the environmental laws from violations warranting only civil or administra-
tive enforcement.36 Congress allowed all permit violations to satisfy the act
requirement for criminal prosecution.37 As a result, Congress criminalized both
substantive permit violations, such as discharging in excess of permit limits,
and more technical permit infractions, such as failing to maintain documents
for a specified period of time. Congress used similarly expansive language in
the criminal provisions that apply to notification, recordkeeping, and filing re-
quirements.38 In the process, Congress made it possible for nearly any violation
of the environmental laws to satisfy the act requirement, regardless of the seri-
ousness of the violation.39
Perhaps Congress acted wisely when it broadly defined the environmental
violations that could be criminal. After all, it is difficult for Congress to antici-
pate the myriad ways that violations might occur in complex regulatory
schemes.40 It may be better to provide broad enforcement tools to address viola-
tions and to rely upon the government to exercise its enforcement authorities in
a reasonable way.41 If the government abuses its discretion in a particular case,
the judge may use her authority to limit the evidence or direct a verdict for the
defendant; if overreaching occurs on a more systemic basis, Congress could
restrict the government’s discretion.
On the other hand, many environmental violations, at least at their incep-
tion, were malum prohibitum (a prohibited wrong) as opposed to malum in se
(inherently wrongful).42 Of course, Congress is not required to limit criminal
34 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d)(1)–(2), (7) (disposal of hazardous waste); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(1)–(2)
(discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(c)(1), (5) (precon-
struction permits).
35 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3).
36 Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1242. R
37 E.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(1)–(2) (criminalizing the negligent or knowing violation of “any
permit condition or limitation” under the CWA).
38 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3) (criminalizing knowing omissions of “material information” and
the making of “any false material statement or representation in any application, label, manifest,
record, report, permit, or other document filed, maintained, or used for purposes of compliance
with regulations promulgated by the Administrator [pursuant to RCRA]”).
39 Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1225; see also Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demand of Integra- R
tion in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO.
L.J. 2407, 2453–55 (1995) (arguing that Congress failed to specify a state of mind that reflects
heightened levels of culpability for environmental crime).
40 Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1233. R
41 Brickey, supra note 16, at 129–30; Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1244. R
42 Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1230. R
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provisions to malum in se conduct. Nonetheless, Congress might have miti-
gated concerns about over-criminalization under the environmental laws43 if it
had limited criminal prosecution to violations that already were or soon would
become malum in se. Indeed, as noted above, Congress took exactly that ap-
proach when it focused on harmful pollution and deceptive conduct. But in
many areas of the environmental enforcement regime, Congress abandoned a
more rigorous definitional effort in favor of catch-all language that imposes
few limits on the act requirement. As a result, the act requirement does little to
limit the role of criminal enforcement under the environmental laws.
The mental state requirement goes further than the act requirement in dis-
tinguishing criminal from civil and administrative violations, at least as a mat-
ter of statutory construction. For most felony violations of the CWA, the CAA,
and RCRA, the government must show that the defendant acted knowingly.44
Criminal violations of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) also are limited to situations where the
defendant acted knowingly.45 Similarly, the misdemeanor provisions of the
CWA apply only when the defendant acted negligently.46 In contrast, civil and
administrative violations of the environmental laws do not require the govern-
ment to prove a culpable mental state; they are strict liability violations, so the
government must prove only that the defendant committed the prohibited act.47
Mental state often is a significant issue during criminal trials because of
the difficulty of proving what a defendant knew. Nonetheless, mental state re-
quirements may not distinguish criminal, civil, and administrative violations as
much as the additional proof requirements suggest.48 Numerous appellate court
decisions have construed “knowingly” under the environmental laws to require
knowledge of the facts that make the charged conduct unlawful but not knowl-
edge that the conduct was illegal.49 Those decisions have drawn support from
the Supreme Court’s admonition in United States v. International Minerals and
Chemical Corp. that “ignorance of the law is no defense” and “where obnox-
ious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that
anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must
be presumed to be aware of the regulation.”50 Moreover, the mental state re-
quirements for environmental crimes mirror the knowledge requirements for
most federal crimes.51 As the Supreme Court explained in Bryan v. United
43 See id. at 1229 (citing Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
703, 709 (2005)).
44 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2012).
45 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (2012).
46 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c).
47 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(c); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b).
48 Compare Susan F. Mandiberg, What Does an Environmental Criminal Know?, 23 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV’T 24 (2009), with J.T. Morgan, The Mythical Erosion of Mens Rea, 23 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 29 (2009).
49 See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d. 533, 537–40 (2d Cir. 1995) (CWA); United States
v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 88 (6th Cir. 1991) (CAA); United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961, 965,
967 (2d. Cir. 1993) (RCRA).
50 United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971).
51 Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1235. R
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States, “unless the language of the statute dictates a different result, the term
‘knowingly’ merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense.”52
As a result, the government must prove the defendant’s knowledge of the
discharges in a CWA case, but is not required to show that the defendant knew
that the CWA requires permits for discharges.53 In a RCRA disposal case, the
government must prove that the defendant intentionally disposed of waste and
knew the waste had the substantial potential to be harmful to human health or
the environment, but it would not need to show that the defendant knew the
waste was hazardous under RCRA or that a permit was required for its dispo-
sal.54 In a CAA case, the government must show that the defendant knew the
nature of the pollutant in question (i.e., the fact that it is asbestos), but it does
not need to show that the defendant knew the pollutant was regulated under the
Act or the scope or requirements of those regulations.55
Since most pollution involves intentional conduct, however, mental state
requirements may not differentiate criminal enforcement from civil and admin-
istrative enforcement, other than foreclosing felony prosecution in cases of ac-
cidental pollution. Civil enforcement cases are not in our dataset,56 but civil
matters often involve conduct that would satisfy the “knowingly” requirement
under the environmental laws. For example, a facility that does not have pollu-
tion controls required under the CAA almost certainly is acting knowingly in
the sense that management knows that the facility does not have a “scrubber”
or whatever pollution control device is required. Yet, the government typically
seeks civil or administrative remedies in CAA cases involving the lack of pol-
lution controls, particularly if the facilities involved are otherwise complying
with the Act, because of uncertainty about the application of the underlying
regulatory requirements.57
Of course, there are environmental violations that clearly occur uninten-
tionally and would be beyond the reach of the criminal provisions of the envi-
ronmental laws, at least for statutes that only allow prosecution for knowing
conduct. For example, a facility that has a CWA permit would not commit a
knowing violation of its permit if it experienced a mechanical failure or some
other unforeseen circumstance that causes a permit exceedance. Such violations
would likely be subject only to civil or administrative enforcement, unless the
52 Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998) (footnote omitted). The Court thus distin-
guished a “knowing” act from a “willful” act, holding that a willful violation required the gov-
ernment to “prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.” Id. at
192 (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994)).
53 See, e.g., Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 541.
54 See, e.g., United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1089–92 (10th Cir. 1993).
55 See, e.g., United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 88 (6th Cir. 1991).
56 As noted in the introductory section of this Article, supra, we do not have comparable informa-
tion about civil enforcement, since those cases involve notice pleading and typically are resolved
by consent decree, neither of which reveals the presence or absence of aggravating factors.
57 See, e.g., United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 626, 630–32 (M.D.N.C.
2003) (government pursues civil enforcement action due in part to the lack of clarity of the CAA’s
New Source Review standards), aff’d on other grounds, 411 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2005), vacated sub
nom. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007).
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company involved did not promptly and accurately report the resulting permit
violations to EPA or the State.
But even where accidental pollution is involved, criminal prosecution still
might be possible for CWA and CAA violations. Those statutes authorize pros-
ecution for negligent discharges (CWA)58 and negligent endangerment (CAA).59
In addition, misdemeanor prosecutions under the Refuse Act60 and the Migra-
tory Bird Treaty Act61 are strict-liability offenses that do not require proof of
mental state.62 Criminal violations of those statutes require the same proof as
civil or administrative claims.
In sum, mental state requirements impose an additional burden of proof on
criminal prosecutors that their civil counterparts are not required to meet. In
addition, since mental state often is difficult to prove and must be shown cir-
cumstantially,63 the additional burden may be significant in some cases (partic-
ularly since prosecutors must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt
rather than by a preponderance of the evidence). But it would be wrong to
conclude that criminal cases are distinguished from civil cases by the presence
or absence of knowing conduct. Polluters often act knowingly, so investigative
and prosecutorial discretion frequently determines whether their knowing con-
duct will result in criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement, not limits im-
posed by Congress.
B. The Challenges of Murky Distinctions Between Criminal, Civil, and
Administrative Violations
How prosecutors should exercise their discretion for environmental crime
is not simply a theoretical question. In the first decade of the environmental
crimes program, disagreement over which environmental violations should be
prosecuted criminally produced dysfunctional relationships between the United
States Attorneys’ Offices, the Environmental Crimes Section, and EPA’s Crimi-
nal Investigations Division.64 The conflict focused on a relatively small subset
of criminal enforcement cases where the political leadership of the Environ-
ment and Natural Resources Division (and at least some career attorneys in the
Environmental Crimes Section) disagreed with United States Attorneys’ Offices
over whether particular cases were appropriate for criminal prosecution.65 Three
58 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(B) (2012).
59 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4) (2012).
60 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2012).
61 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012).
62 See United States v. Apollo Energies Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 684–86 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding no
mental state requirement for prosecution under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act); United States v.
White Fuel Corp., 498 F.3d 619, 622 (1st Cir. 1974) (finding no mental state requirement for
prosecution under the Refuse Act).
63 See United States v. Williams, 195 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1999).
64 See William T. Hassler, Congressional Oversight of Federal Environmental Prosecutions: The
Trashing of Environmental Crimes, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10074 (1994); Lazarus, supra note 7, at R
868–75; Starr, supra note 15, at 902–12. R
65 Six cases became the fulcrum of the conflict, although there were broader systemic issues
within the Justice Department as well. See WILLIAM J. CORCORAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
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Congressional investigations and at least two internal Justice Department re-
views addressed whether there had been political interference with several
high-profile environmental prosecutions.66 To some degree, the environmental
enforcement controversies of the 1990s were manifestations of a perennial
power struggle within the Justice Department over who has the final say over
charging decisions.67 Such “turf battles” can be acute in regulatory enforce-
ment and areas of new law where there is a perceived need for uniformity in
how prosecutors exercise their discretion to charge cases criminally. In these
contexts, there are often disputes among prosecutors and law enforcement per-
sonnel about whether particular cases are appropriate for criminal enforcement.
Disagreements may have been more contentious in the environmental
crimes context, however, because the environmental laws do not make mean-
ingful distinctions among criminal, civil, and administrative violations. It is not
surprising that there would be strong dissenting views about whether particular
cases warrant criminal prosecution in a law enforcement program where the
role of criminal enforcement is ambiguous. Reasonable people may differ about
the proper exercise of discretion in individual cases. But, in the early years of
the environmental crimes program, those disputes were explosive because of
broader uncertainty about when environmental violations should result in crim-
inal enforcement.
The Justice Department and EPA have moved beyond the internal chal-
lenges that marred the first decade of the environmental crimes program. By
1994, United States Attorneys’ Offices were no longer required to seek ap-
proval from officials in Washington before bringing criminal charges in envi-
ronmental cases.68 The removal of approval requirements facilitated a more
collaborative working relationship between prosecutors in the Environmental
Crimes Section and Assistant United States Attorneys. Over time, prosecutors
and investigators developed a better sense of which cases warranted criminal
enforcement.69 With more experience working together, prosecutors and inves-
tigators also established the kind of trust that allows disagreements over indi-
vidual cases without triggering the seismic battles that shook the criminal
enforcement program in the 1990s. Even during the administration of George
INTERNAL REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PROGRAM (1994)
[hereinafter JUSTICE INTERNAL REVIEW] (on file with author).
66 See Environmental Crimes Act of 1992, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 126–30 (1993); EPA’s Criminal
Enforcement Program, Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigations of the H.
Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992); Environmental Crimes at the
Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Facility, Hearings before the Subcomm. On Investigations and
Oversight, of the H. Comm. On Science, Space, and Technology, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. Vols. 1-11
(1992); JUSTICE INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 65; Memorandum from Mark H. Dubester, Acting R
Chief, Pub. Corruption and Gov’t Fraud Section of the U.S. Attorney’s Office of D.C., and Steven
Bunnell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office for D.C., to Webster L. Hubbell, Assoc.
Attorney Gen. (Apr. 8, 1994) (on file with author).
67 Starr, supra note 15, at 914 n.81 (noting the historical tension between Main Justice and the 93 R
U.S. Attorneys’ Offices).
68 See USAM, supra note 24, at § 5-11.00 (updated in 2008). R
69 Memorandum from Earl Devaney, supra note 23, at 4–5. R
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W. Bush, when many environmental efforts faltered, the environmental crimes
program received strong support from senior Administration officials.70
Yet the environmental crimes program continues to wrestle with major
issues that owe at least some of their roots to the lack of clarity about when
environmental violations should be prosecuted criminally. Concerns about ran-
domness persist in the environmental enforcement context. Practitioners con-
tinue to complain that criminal prosecution depends less upon the law and facts
of the case and more on whether the violations are first brought to the attention
of a civil regulator or a criminal investigator.71 A related concern is that cases
might begin as civil matters but could be later referred for criminal enforcement
because the company involved has a contentious relationship with EPA or state
regulatory personnel. Neither the fortuity of where a case begins nor the tem-
perament of regulatory personnel should be determining factors in whether a
case is prosecuted criminally. Yet in a regulatory system where the same acts
can give rise to criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement, such considera-
tions might make a difference.
In an effort to promote greater uniformity in how it exercises its investiga-
tive discretion, EPA has developed case screening protocols for each of its re-
gions.72 The case screening protocols address what types of information civil
enforcement personnel are expected to share with criminal investigators. In the-
ory, the case screening process should promote consistency in how investiga-
tive resources are utilized and in deciding which matters might be brought to
the Justice Department for possible prosecution. At a minimum, the process
should ensure that whether criminal or civil enforcement is pursued is not de-
termined based on which office originates the investigation.
In practice, the effectiveness of case screening protocols depends upon
how rigorously they are implemented in the different EPA regions. It is theoret-
ically possible for ten EPA regions to take similar approaches to case screening.
In reality, there is little similarity from region to region in much of what EPA
(or any other federal regulatory agency) does. Some of those differences may
reflect disparate regional priorities and demographic or geographic variations.
But at least some may be attributable to different attitudes about the role of
enforcement generally and criminal enforcement in particular. Moreover, crimi-
nal cases often originate in environmental crimes task forces and involve prose-
cutors from the earliest stages of the investigation.73 If a task force has launched
a particular investigation or if a prosecutor already is involved, it is unlikely
that EPA case screening protocols will have much influence on whether crimi-
nal charges are pursued.
70 David M. Uhlmann, Strange Bedfellows, ENVTL. FORUM, May–June 2008, at 40, 40–44 (sug-
gesting that criminal prosecution thrived because Administration officials wanted to appear tough
on crime and to ensure a level playing field for companies that complied with the environmental
laws — and perhaps to ensure at least some positive press about the Administration’s environmen-
tal protection efforts).
71 Starr, supra note 15, 913–14; Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1242–43. R
72 Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1243 n.102. R
73 Criminal Environmental Crime Task Force Partners, EPA, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/09w8
Ufnyuwd/.
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Another persistent concern about criminal enforcement under the environ-
mental laws is that it focuses on particular sectors at the expense of a broader,
comprehensive approach to environmental crime. The best example historically
may be asbestos cases. Asbestos was widely used in the United States as build-
ing insulation and for its fire retardant qualities until it was discovered to be
carcinogenic.74 Asbestos is now a hazardous air pollutant under the CAA.75 The
Act imposes numerous regulatory requirements on building demolition and as-
bestos remediation to protect workers and the public from exposure.76 Because
safe asbestos removal is costly, many asbestos removal jobs are done illegally.
These “rip and run” remediation projects have been the primary focus of crimi-
nal enforcement efforts under the CAA, yet are rarely the subject of civil en-
forcement. The question raised by the emphasis on asbestos cases is whether
EPA should focus its limited enforcement resources on more toxic pollution
from large stationary sources such as factories, refineries, and power plants,
which may have more far-reaching health effects.
This critique of case selection leads to another complaint about environ-
mental criminal enforcement: namely, that it reaches conduct that should not be
prosecuted at all. Some of these arguments are merely theoretical, such as the
oft-repeated rhetorical claim that throwing an apple core into the Potomac
River would be a criminal violation of the CWA. Others involve controversial
areas of enforcement such as wetlands violations.77 Still others involve laments
that criminal enforcement targets law-abiding small business people who be-
come ensnared in a regulatory maze despite their best compliance efforts.78 To
assess these over-criminalization claims and related questions about how prose-
cutors exercise their broad discretion under the environmental laws, we need a
better empirical understanding of environmental criminal cases.
Of course, it is not possible to address all of the concerns that have been
raised about criminal enforcement in one article. I nonetheless mention these
issues here because they are the kind of shortcomings and possible mispercep-
tions that are possible when the role of criminal prosecution is ill-defined.
Moreover, I would suggest that misperceptions persist because there has not
been comprehensive empirical research about when charges are brought for
environmental crime and the aggravating factors that are present in those cases.
74 Asbestos, AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0joEiXFnXwg/.
75 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2012).
76 Id. § 7412(h).
77 Rand Paul, EPA Regulations Violate Constitutional Rights: Out-of-Control Agency Turns Every-
day Life Into A Federal Crime, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2011), http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0LEJ
pReYLyz (criticizing Clean Water prosecutions of John Poszgai and John Rapanos for illegally
filling wetlands without a permit).
78 Timothy Lynch, Polluting Our Principles: Environmental Prosecutions and the Bill of Rights,
15 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 161, 168 (1996). The concern about over-criminalization persists
and is not limited to environmental crime, as demonstrated by the creation of the House Judiciary
Committee Bi-Partisan Task Force on Over-Criminalization. See Press Release, House Judiciary
Comm., House Judiciary Committee Creates Bipartisan Task Force on Over-Criminalization (May
5, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/N5UC-FVBV (“Americans who make innocent mistakes
should not be charged with criminal offenses.”).
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C. Prior Empirical Studies of Environmental Criminal Enforcement
Prior empirical studies have addressed the role of criminal enforcement in
the environmental regulatory scheme. The study design that is most similar to
my research is a 2001 study by Kathleen F. Brickey that focused on one statute,
RCRA, to consider the exercise of prosecutorial discretion for environmental
crimes and address claims that environmental prosecutors were abusing their
discretion. Professor Brickey’s study of RCRA hazardous waste cases prose-
cuted from 1983–1992 aimed to create “an empirical testing ground for specu-
lative claims about special dangers inherent in criminal enforcement of
environmental laws.”79
Professor Brickey obtained data by analyzing an EPA database containing
summaries of environmental criminal prosecutions. Professor Brickey focused
on 140 RCRA criminal violations investigated by EPA that resulted in prosecu-
tion over a ten-year period.80 Her project describes in detail the quantitative
data surrounding each case, with thorough breakdowns of basic charging data,
job titles, industries, information about the nature and quantity of the waste,
and other characteristics.81
Based on her empirical analysis, Professor Brickey found that most RCRA
violations involved multiple actors as co-defendants, inferring that multiparty
violations are often “barometers of the nature and the scope of the underlying
criminal activity.”82 She determined that most individual defendants have re-
sponsible positions in the organizational setting where the violation occurs and
most are “knowledgeable economic actors who are in a position to prevent the
violation from occurring.”83 She also analyzed the types of waste found, con-
cluding that criminal charges frequently involved “flagrantly illegal” cases
with “unmistakably hazardous” waste.84
Professor Brickey’s analysis concluded that RCRA prosecutions targeted
obviously illegal conduct: The “violations are often pervasive and almost al-
ways potentially harmful to human health and the environment.”85 Countering
critics, Professor Brickey found that most hazardous waste prosecutions in-
volved defendants engaged in highly regulated conduct without a permit:
“[C]ontrary to the stereotyped example of isolated and unavoidable technical
violations, most RCRA prosecutions are brought against businesses and busi-
ness owners, officers and managers who operate outside the regulatory system
and against those who are within the system but seek to undermine it by com-
mitting crimes of misrepresentation and concealment.”86 Professor Brickey also
commended prosecutorial discretion: “In practice, prosecutors are highly selec-
79 Kathleen F. Brickey, Charging Practices in Hazardous Waste Crime Prosecutions, 62 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1077, 1079 (2001).
80 Id. at 1077, 1095, 1097.
81 Id. at 1097–98.
82 Id. at 1084.
83 Id. at 1085.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1133–34.
86 Id. at 1085.
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tive in deciding what cases to pursue. They assign priority to prosecuting rogue
operators who make no pretense of complying with regulatory requirements
and to prosecuting permit holders who lie to conceal their noncompliance. That
should hardly be cause for alarm.”87
Professor Brickey’s research was limited in scope to RCRA violations, but
as noted above her study targeted issues and questions that are similar to those
addressed by the Environmental Crimes Project. Her study operated within
similar limitations, including the lack of a control group of declined cases or a
comparison group of civil enforcement actions. At the same time, Professor
Brickey’s study differs from my work both because I have looked at all pollu-
tion control laws, rather than a single statute, and because I have based my
analysis on court documents, as opposed to an internal EPA database of case
summaries written by investigators. In addition, while Professor Brickey asked
whether facilities were operating outside the regulatory system and/or engaging
in deceptive conduct, I have analyzed cases for a wider range of aggravating
factors that may influence discretion. Nonetheless, her findings regarding
RCRA cases are consistent with my findings more than a decade later.88
In 2003, Professor Jeremy Firestone compared the frequency of criminal,
civil, and administrative enforcement to shed light on forum choice and how
EPA uses its enforcement tools.89 Professor Firestone compiled information
about EPA enforcement cases from 1990–97. He then analyzed a random sam-
ple of 325 CAA, CWA, and RCRA enforcement actions out of 411 criminal,
785 civil, and 3,465 administrative cases initiated during that timeframe.90  In-
formation on each case was collected from complaints, indictments, and plea
agreements. Professor Firestone used statistical modeling to analyze how forum
choice was influenced by (1) political factors, (2) environmental damage, and
(3) prior noncompliance.91
Professor Firestone observed that discretion is broad under the environ-
mental laws, perhaps even more so than is commonly understood. He stated
that policymakers “may not fully appreciate the interplay among administra-
tive, civil judicial, and criminal sanctions — that is, venue choice.”92 He none-
theless expressed confidence in how EPA exercised its discretion over forum
choice:
Overall, the evidence presented here is encouraging. In its choice of
enforcement venue under the CAA, CWA, and RCRA, EPA appears
to be motivated by a desire to minimize environmental harm and
maximize social welfare. Conversely, there is little evidence that EPA
is motivated by a desire to maximize political benefits.93
87 Id. at 1134.
88 See Part III(d), infra.
89 Jeremy Firestone, Enforcement of Pollution Laws and Regulations: An Analysis of Forum
Choice, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 105 (2003).
90 Id. at 106, 145.
91 Id. at 106.
92 Id. at 105.
93 Id. at 158.
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At the same time, Professor Firestone voiced concern about the fact that EPA
seemed more likely to pursue criminal enforcement against small companies
than against Fortune 500 companies.94
Professor Firestone provides a framework for analyzing forum choice in
criminal, civil, and administrative cases. How EPA makes the threshold deter-
mination about whether to seek administrative, civil, or criminal remedies is an
important part of understanding the role of criminal enforcement. But it still
leaves unaddressed the question of what aggravating factors are present in
criminal prosecutions.
The Environmental Crimes Project provides current and comprehensive
statutory, geographic, and outcome data about environmental criminal enforce-
ment. The Project also sheds light on prosecutorial discretion in environmental
criminal enforcement by determining what aggravating factors are present in
the cases that are charged. The empirical data should help promote a better
understanding of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion for environmental
crime.95
II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PROJECT
The Environmental Crimes Project is an ongoing faculty-student collabo-
rative research project launched in Fall 2010 at the University of Michigan Law
School. Student researchers have obtained and examined charging documents,
plea agreements, and judgments for all defendants charged with criminal viola-
tions of the environmental laws in cases that were investigated by EPA. The
goals of the Project are twofold. First, we have gathered quantitative data, in-
cluding geographical information, defendant types, statutes charged, sizes of
criminal penalties, and percentage of defendants receiving jail time. No other
empirical study of environmental crime has sought to collect data from such a
broad range of cases. The database will be publicly available for scholars and
practitioners. Second, we have developed empirical data regarding the aggra-
vating factors present in cases charged under the environmental laws in order to
better understand how prosecutorial discretion is exercised for environmental
crime.
94 Id. at 148, 158.
95 In addition to the Brickey and Firestone articles, three other empirical studies have produced
quantitative data regarding environmental criminal enforcement. See Mark A. Cohen, Environ-
mental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement
of Federal Environmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1054 (1992) (analyzing envi-
ronmental criminal enforcement and sentencing to determine whether trends in enforcement re-
flect legal and economic theories of criminal enforcement); JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS, 1997 (1999)
(comprehensive data on all environmental enforcement actions during 1997, including criminal,
civil, and administrative cases); RENA STEINZOR & AIMEE SIMPSON, GOING TOO EASY? MARY-
LAND’S CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF WATER POLLUTION LAWS PROTECTING THE CHESAPEAKE BAY,
CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM WHITE PAPER NO. 1212 (2012) (examining state and federal
enforcement actions regarding water pollution violations in the Chesapeake Bay).
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Since 2010, 120 Michigan Law students have participated in the Project,96
obtaining and reviewing court documents for nearly 900 defendants. The Pro-
ject has thus far focused on all defendants prosecuted under federal environ-
mental statutes who were criminally charged from January 1, 2005 through
December 31, 2010. This time range ensured that we would be able to obtain
court documents from the electronic records system maintained by the Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts97 and provided a manageable but
representative number of cases and defendants. The data collected from these
case documents have been aggregated and organized in a searchable database
that will facilitate research and analysis of environmental criminal enforcement.
We intend to update this database regularly to include new cases, beginning
with all cases charged in 2011–2012.
EPA supplied the initial case documents for our analysis. These included
indictments, informations, plea agreements, judgments, docket reports, and
EPA and Justice Department press releases. For each case, we analyzed at mini-
mum an initial charging document and final judgment; we examined other
court documents if they were available. When necessary, researchers retrieved
missing documents through the electronic filing system for the federal courts
and by contacting individual courts and United States Attorneys’ Offices.
From this large sample, we excluded several groups of cases. First, to keep
the sample size manageable, we excluded cases that were charged outside of
the period between 2005 and 2010. Second, we omitted state cases brought by
state prosecutors, since most criminal cases are prosecuted in federal court, and
EPA works on only a small percentage of the cases that are prosecuted in state
court (the majority of which are investigated by state law enforcement person-
nel). Third, we focused on pollution crime and did not include cases involving
only wildlife crime (the majority of which are investigated by the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service), although cases that involve both pollution violations
and wildlife crime were included in the study. For example, cases that were
prosecuted under only the Migratory Bird Treaty Act were omitted, but cases
involving both CWA charges and Migratory Bird Treaty Act charges were in-
cluded. Finally, we excluded cases that, although investigated by EPA, did not
have any connection to environmental protection,98 as well as those for which
researchers could not find court documents.
Researchers collected four categories of data for each defendant. First, re-
searchers recorded basic case information, including case name, defendant
name, city and state of violation, docket number, EPA region, federal judicial
96 See Appendix A, infra, for a list of the student participants.
97 Public Access to Court Electronic Records, PACER, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/051cVaWw
mwo.
98 As discussed in Part III, infra, the statute charged most frequently in environmental cases is
Title 18 of the United States Code. We included these cases but ensured that there was an environ-
mental nexus, either based on the statute charged (i.e., one of the statutes that EPA is responsible
for administering) or because the conduct involved raised environmental protection or public
health concerns.
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district, judge name, charging date, and statutes charged. These data will facili-
tate research regarding enforcement levels and any changes that occur from
year to year, examination of any geographical disparities in the prosecution of
environmental crime, and charging trends in terms of the statutes used most
frequently.
Second, researchers recorded basic information about the specific defen-
dant. The Project categorized each defendant as either an individual or corpora-
tion. For individual defendants, researchers noted the type of defendant:
corporate officer, sole proprietor, manager, low-level employee, independent
contractor, or environmental compliance person. For corporate defendants, re-
searchers noted the defendant industry and whether the business was public or
privately held.99 These data will assist research about the types of defendants
who are prosecuted for environmental crimes and the extent to which prosecu-
tors pursue corporations or individuals.
Third, researchers recorded outcome information for each defendant. Re-
searchers indicated the outcome of each charged violation — guilty plea, guilty
verdict, acquittal, dismissal, or mistrial — and recorded the final judgment
date. If the defendant ultimately pled guilty or was convicted, researchers re-
corded information about the outcome, including whether it was a felony or
misdemeanor conviction; the length of jail and probation periods; the existence
of cooperation agreements; the amounts of fines, restitution, remedial, and
community service payments; and court-ordered environmental compliance
plans. These data will facilitate consideration of conviction rates and the
sentences imposed for environmental crime.
Fourth, researchers reviewed the court documents for each defendant to
determine the presence of four aggravating factors: significant environmental
harm or public health effects, deceptive or misleading conduct, operating
outside the regulatory system, and repetitive violations. These are the aggravat-
ing factors that I have suggested should be considered by the government when
exercising prosecutorial discretion.100
The first factor, significant environmental harm or public health effects,
assumes actual harm. Researchers looked for evidence of actual harm to the
environment or public health, not merely hypothetical harm or risk of harm,
both of which are present in most (if not all) environmental cases.101 Research-
ers looked for a variety of characteristics that are included in United States
99 We also attempted to gather publicly available information related to the size and financials of
corporate defendants. Data availability, however, proved to be inconsistent. Most of the corporate
defendants were privately held businesses with no public information available. Even where infor-
mation was available, it was difficult to verify and often contradictory. We hope to expand on
these data in the future, but for now corporate defendant data remain incomplete.
100 Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1245–52. R
101 Our focus on actual environmental harm or public health effects is a narrower inquiry than my
prior writing suggested. In my earlier paper, I also considered risk of harm relevant. Id. at 1246.
We revised this factor because nearly all environmental violations involve at least a risk of harm
(otherwise, the act would not be prohibited). We therefore only coded for this factor where there
was evidence of actual harm or charges of knowing or negligent endangerment.
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Sentencing Commission guidelines for environmental crime,102 including seri-
ous bodily injuries or deaths,103 cleanup involving substantial expense (greater
than $100,000),104 and evacuation or urgent emergency response.105 Each of
these factors leads to enhanced sentences under the Sentencing Guidelines and
therefore is a reasonable proxy for the harm determination. Researchers also
coded for environmental harm when there was evidence of animal mortality or
other indicia of ecological harm. There was one exception to the general exclu-
sion of hypothetical harm: Researchers coded for this first factor where the
defendant was charged with knowing or negligent endangerment under the en-
vironmental laws. The fact that the prosecutor brought an endangerment charge
suggests that the defendant’s willingness to place others in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury played a role in the government’s decision to
bring criminal charges.
The second factor, deceptive or misleading conduct, covers evidence of
dishonest behavior. Deceptive or misleading conduct can occur in the commis-
sion of an offense, or after the offense has already been committed in order to
conceal violations or mislead authorities. Researchers looked for three sub-
characteristics: commission (situations where the substantive offense involved
deceptive conduct); false reporting or recordkeeping (such as falsification of
discharge monitoring reports); and cover-up (efforts to hide information about
wrongdoing either in contemplation of an investigation or when an investiga-
tion is ongoing).
The third factor, operating outside the regulatory system, focuses on com-
panies and individuals that completely and deliberately avoid regulatory com-
pliance, thereby gaining an unfair competitive advantage and undermining the
effectiveness of the regulatory system. This factor does not include defendants
that comply with most, but not all, environmental regulations. Researchers
looked for evidence of several sub-characteristics, including failure to acquire
or renew permits, failure to keep or maintain records, failure to monitor, and
failure to report. Unlike the other prosecutorial discretion factors, researchers
recorded evidence of any of these sub-characteristics even if they ultimately
determined that the defendant was not operating outside the environmental reg-
ulatory system. Evidence that a defendant failed to monitor emissions or main-
tain records in some instances, for example, remain valuable data points. But
the overall factor is aimed at those defendants who make no effort to comply
with environmental protection requirements.
102 See U.S.S.G. §§ 2Q1.1–2Q1.6 (2012).
103 U.S.S.G. §§ 2Q1.2(b)(2), 2Q1.3(b)(3) (substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily injury).
104 U.S.S.G. §§ 2Q1.2(b)(3), 2Q1.3(b)(3) (substantial cost of cleanup); United States v. Bogas,
920 F. 2d 363, 369 (6th Cir. 1990) (defining substantial cost of cleanup as cleanups exceeding
$100,000).
105 U.S.S.G. §§ 2Q1.2(b)(3), 2Q1.3(b)(3) (evacuation or emergency response).
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The fourth factor, repetitive violations, focuses on the duration of non-
compliance.106 Environmental violations can involve isolated events, but they
are often a part of a longer pattern of violations. To code for repetitive viola-
tions, researchers calculated the duration of charged conduct contained in all
substantive counts of the indictment. Substantive counts were defined as all
charges brought under the environmental laws or Title 18, but exclusive of
conspiracy. Researchers also recorded the duration of all violations alleged in
the indictment that involved the same type of violations as the charged conduct.
Where the duration for either of these two figures exceeded one day, the con-
duct was coded as repetitive. For cases where conspiracy was the only charge,
the duration determinations were based on the substantive conduct that was the
object of the conspiracy. Where conspiracy charges were combined with sub-
stantive charges, the basis for determining duration was the substantive
charges.107
In addition to the four hypothesized factors, researchers also indicated the
presence of any additional aggravating factors. This measure acknowledges the
inherent judgment calls involved in any decision to prosecute criminal viola-
tions under the environmental statutes. If researchers found that an additional
factor, such as risk of danger to children, seemed to be a driving force in the
decision to press charges, they were directed to record the additional factor and
its relevance.
In multi-defendant cases, researchers coded the same aggravating factors
consistently for all defendants. This strategy is consistent with the Project’s
conception of prosecutorial discretion, as one defendant’s actions can affect the
prosecutor’s decision to bring criminal charges against all defendants connected
with the case. However, researchers made an exception for cases where a single
or small number of defendants in a multi-defendant case engaged in conduct
that appeared to be truly separate from the criminal activity driving the prose-
106 In contrast with significant environmental harm, where we used a narrower definition than
what I described previously, see supra note 101, for repetitive violations, we used a broader R
definition. I had intended to limit the fourth factor to facilities that had not responded to civil or
administrative enforcement but it often was unclear from the charging documents whether facili-
ties had been the subject of prior enforcement efforts. In addition, repetitiveness is an aggravating
factor regardless of whether there are previous enforcement efforts. Prosecutors are likely to view
as more culpable conduct that occurs repeatedly, or single events that transpire over a period of
days, weeks, months, or years. In Part IV(D), infra, I provide a breakdown of our data using these
different categories of violation duration.
107 To illustrate, an indictment charging nine knowing discharge counts under the CWA on nine
consecutive days would be coded as repetitive, with nine days recorded for both the substantive
count duration and all-violation duration. The same indictment with a conspiracy alleging a year
of knowing violations to the NPDES permit prior to the nine charged discharges would yield the
same substantive count duration; the additional twelve months would be added only to the dura-
tion calculation for all violations alleged that involved the same kind of conduct (summing to
twelve months plus nine days). The same would be true absent a conspiracy charge, where the
original indictment referred to twelve prior months of knowing discharges but actually charged
only the nine consecutive days. For an indictment with a single, yearlong conspiracy charge to
violate the CWA with overt acts spanning six months, we would record six months in both the
substantive duration and all-violation duration categories.
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cution. The most common example of this type of conduct is perjury that oc-
curs after initial criminal charges have already been filed. In this case, a
researcher would note “deceptive conduct” for only the defendant who com-
mitted perjury, and not for related defendants.
The Project’s data collection and review processes were rigorous. I worked
with the Project supervisors to develop a guide that explained how to collect
quantitative data and how to code for the aggravating factors. The supervisors
trained the student researchers in a series of small sessions. In collecting data,
the Project required students to explain each of their qualitative, aggravating
factor answers in a few brief sentences, with cites to the record. These explana-
tions helped subsequent reviewers and supervisors ensure uniformity.
At least three students examined each defendant, entering data into an in-
tranet content management system accessible to all researchers. Any qualitative
disputes were resolved by the Project supervisors, with whom I met regularly to
discuss issues that arose during the research. To ensure uniformity, the supervi-
sors conducted two final reviews of each case, paying particular attention to
each aggravating factor and the explanation given by the students.
As with any comprehensive undertaking, the Project faced limitations.
First, as noted above, it is not clear whether it will be possible to develop a
comparison group of civil cases.  We will assess this possibility during Phase II
of the Project. Second, while we made extensive efforts to analyze every case
that was charged between 2005 and 2010, it was not possible to obtain informa-
tion about every matter. EPA provided an initial set of court documents, and we
obtained court documents for most remaining cases using the Public Access to
Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) system. Where documents were not
available on PACER, we contacted the relevant clerk’s office to obtain the doc-
ument. In nearly every instance, we were able to acquire the necessary docu-
ments and conduct our analysis. In a small number of cases, however, no court
documents (or not all required documents) were available; those cases were
excluded.
Finally, prosecutorial discretion is by nature an inherently subjective pro-
cess. The aggravating factors that I have identified admit to definitional chal-
lenges. What harm is significant harm? What deception qualifies as misleading
conduct? When is noncompliance so extensive that a company should be
viewed as operating outside the regulatory system? What qualifies as a repeti-
tive violation? We developed criteria for answering these and other questions
raised by the Project but our results are affected by those criteria and the
choices they reflect. Nonetheless, our ability to provide rigorous analysis of a
consistently applied set of factors provides empirical evidence of the aggravat-
ing factors present in environmental prosecutions.
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III. ANALYSIS OF STATUTES AND VIOLATIONS MOST FREQUENTLY CHARGED
AS ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
The first step in developing a better understanding of how prosecutorial
discretion has been exercised for environmental violations is to examine the
statutes that are charged in environmental cases and the types of violations
involved. Empirical data about what is charged, as opposed to characterizations
based on individual “poster child” cases,108 will enhance our knowledge about
what conduct is prosecuted criminally. Such data also may help address ques-
tions about whether prosecutors are limiting criminal enforcement to the type
of violations that are most deserving of prosecution.
It merits emphasis at the outset that criminal enforcement occurs less fre-
quently than civil enforcement and far less frequently than administrative en-
forcement. In the six years covered by our study, there was an average of 144
defendants prosecuted in 111 cases each year.109  In 2010, the last year covered
by our study, the Justice Department filed 172 civil judicial enforcement cases
on behalf of EPA, and EPA issued 1802 final administrative penalty orders.110
Of course, the fact that the government pursues criminal charges less frequently
does not resolve questions about how prosecutorial discretion is exercised. But
the limited use of criminal enforcement provides relevant context: The govern-
ment reserves criminal enforcement for a small subset of all violations of the
environmental laws.
This Part will present empirical data regarding the statutes and conduct
charged in environmental criminal prosecutions. As shown in Figure 1 below,
the statutes that the government charged most frequently were Title 18 of the
United States Code and the CWA, followed by the CAA, RCRA, and the Act to
Prevent Pollution from Ships (“APPS”):
108 Much of the controversy surrounding environmental criminal enforcement involves claims
about the field that are based on isolated cases. See, e.g., Paul, supra note 77 (offering a critique R
based on prosecutions of John Poszgai and John Rapanos for wetlands violations). The merits of
those claims are debatable but none involve the comprehensive empirical analysis provided in this
Article. In that regard, I note that Senator Paul has focused on wetlands cases, yet our six-year
dataset identified only 16 defendants charged with wetlands violations (1.9% of all defendants).
109 The number of criminal defendants charged varied from a low of 126 defendants during 2008
to a high of 157 defendants in 2010; the number of criminal cases ranged from a low of 95 during
2010 to a high of 123 in 2005. Multi-defendant cases explain why there are more defendants than
cases each year.
110 Fiscal Year 2010 EPA Enforcement and Compliance Annual Results (Dec. 2, 2010) at 17, 20,
available at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0CsfSQoYry9. In 2010, EPA conducted 21,000 inspec-
tions or evaluations at facilities in the United States. Id. at 23.
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I analyze the data regarding charges under each of these statutes in the Sections
that follow.111 In addition to providing charging data, I examine how prosecu-
tors exercise their discretion in selecting which violations to charge, since the
environmental laws criminalize a wide range of possible statutory violations.
A. Title 18 Charges
Title 18 is the heart of the federal criminal code and is used by all federal
prosecutors, not just environmental prosecutors. Title 18 charges include con-
spiracy, false statements, fraud, obstruction of justice, and perjury.112 The inclu-
sion of Title 18 charges incorporates the traditional “badges of criminality”
that prosecutors emphasize when exercising discretion.113 It is easier to under-
stand why a regulatory violation is criminal when the defendant is dishonest,
conceals misconduct, or destroys evidence, all of which can be violations of
Title 18. In addition, judges are more familiar with (and more receptive to) Title
18 charges.114
As illustrated by Figure 2, the overwhelming majority of Title 18 charges
involved conspiracy (191 out of 375 defendants charged under Title 18) and
false statements (170 out of 375 defendants), followed by obstruction of justice
(72 out of 375 defendants).
111 The total number of charges reflected in Figure 1 and in the sections that follow is higher than
the total number of defendants in our database because 50% of the defendants (434 out of 864)
were charged in multi-count indictments. Where a defendant was charged under multiple statutes
in a multi-count indictment, we coded for each statute charged against that defendant.
112 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1001, 1341, 1501–1519, 1621, 1623 (2012) (conspiracy, false state-
ments, fraud, obstruction of justice, and perjury, respectively).
113 Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1248. R
114 Id.
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The use of conspiracy charges does not correlate automatically with the
more sinister behavior associated with group criminal activity. Conspiracy
charges can be brought any time more than one person is involved in the of-
fense, a frequent occurrence in environmental cases so long as there is suffi-
cient evidence to prove that the defendants agreed to engage in unlawful
conduct. Conspiracy offers substantial benefits to prosecutors, including the
ability to charge members of the conspiracy with substantive offenses commit-
ted in furtherance of the conspiracy,115 as well as the ability to introduce co-
conspirator statements at trial.116 As a result, the object of the conspiracy often
will be a substantive violation of the underlying environmental statute (i.e., a
conspiracy to violate the CWA), so the overt acts may be limited to environ-
mental violations that do not involve deception. In our dataset, 55 defendants
(29% of all defendants charged with conspiracy) were in this category.
However, prosecutors often will charge conspiracies that include conceal-
ing or covering up the underlying environmental violations. In those cases, the
inclusion of a conspiracy charge may reflect a more culpable mental state. Most
of the conspiracies in our dataset involved deceptive or misleading conduct as
an aggravating factor (92% or 176 defendants), and a large percentage also
included false statements, concealment, or obstruction of justice as objects of
the conspiracy (71% or 136 defendants). Included in those numbers were 14
defendants charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States based on the
concerted efforts of co-conspirators to undermine the government’s environ-
115 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646–48 (1946).
116
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (stating that co-conspirator statements made during and in further-
ance of a conspiracy are not hearsay).
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mental protection efforts.117 Those cases also involve the kind of misleading
conduct more typically associated with conspiracy charges.
False statement charges under Title 18, which were brought against 20%
of the defendants included in our study (170 out of 864 defendants), often in-
volve a choice to use Title 18 instead of the false statement provisions of the
environmental laws. Prosecutors who elect to proceed under Title 18 for false
statements may do so because those charges are more widely used in federal
cases generally and/or because Title 18 provides a maximum sentence of five
years imprisonment compared to two-year maximums under the environmental
laws.118 Whatever the reason, the frequent use of false statement charges, partic-
ularly when combined with the significant number of obstruction of justice
charges, highlight the role of deceptive and misleading conduct in environmen-
tal criminal enforcement cases.119
B. Clean Water Act Charges
The CWA was the most frequently charged environmental statute in the
six years covered by our study.120 The CWA includes both felony and misde-
meanor provisions, depending upon whether the violation occurred knowingly
or negligently. Our study showed that 184 defendants were charged with know-
ing violations of the CWA, and 129 defendants were charged with negligent
violations of the Act.121 The number of defendants charged with negligence
appeared high, particularly in light of the fact that the CWA authorizes criminal
prosecution based on simple negligence, which has prompted concerns about
over-criminalization under the CWA.122 The large number of CWA negligence
charges could be interpreted as evidence of prosecutorial over-reaching, so we
analyzed the negligence defendants to determine whether (1) negligence was
charged as part of a plea bargain for what could have been charged as knowing
conduct; (2) significant harm or deceptive conduct were present; or (3) the vio-
lations involved only ordinary negligence.
117 See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (making it a crime “if two or more persons conspire . . . to defraud
the United States”). Conspiracies to defraud the United States are often referred to as “Klein”
conspiracies based on the seminal tax case, United States v. Klein. 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957)
(conspiracy to defraud the administration of federal tax laws); see also Uhlmann, supra note 9, at R
1248–49.
118 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012) (five-year maximum term of imprisonment) with 33
U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4) (2012) (two-year maximum).
119 See infra Part IV, Section B.
120 The number of defendants prosecuted under the CWA declined during the last three years of
our study from an average of 57 defendants from 2005 to 2007 to an average of 45 defendants
from 2008 to 2010. If this decline continues, it would be worthwhile to evaluate whether it is
attributable to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006),
which has restricted CWA jurisdiction.
121 There are 6 defendants in the study who were charged with both knowing and negligent viola-
tions of the CWA.
122 See, e.g., Paul S. Rosenzweig, The Over-Criminalization of Social and Economic Conduct, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 7 (2003).
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We determined that 62 defendants were charged with negligence even
though their conduct was intentional, and that 15 defendants were charged with
CWA negligence along with knowing conduct under the CWA or another stat-
ute. We identified 19 defendants who committed negligent violations that
caused significant harm, and 21 defendants who engaged in deceptive conduct.
As a result, only 12 defendants were prosecuted solely for negligence in the
absence of knowing violations, significant harm, or deceptive conduct, a small
percentage of all CWA defendants (3.9%).123
We then reviewed the court documents regarding those 12 defendants to
determine whether their violations might have been more appropriate for civil
or administrative enforcement. For 5 of the 12 defendants, the misconduct in-
volved repetitive violations; 1 of the 5 defendants also engaged in misconduct
that involved operating outside the regulatory system. For the remaining 7 de-
fendants, it appeared that the charges involved ordinary negligence on a single
day.124 Of course, prosecutors often narrow charges to a single day for plea
purposes, and the charges against these 7 defendants may have involved an
appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion for other reasons. But prosecu-
tors should be cautious about charging negligent violations with no aggravating
factors present; non-criminal sanctions may be more appropriate in those cases.
Another major factor in assessing what type of conduct is prosecuted
under the CWA is the nature of the violations involved. As Figure 3 shows,
most CWA violations that are charged criminally involve illegal discharges:
123 A study of CWA negligence charges between 1987 and 1997 also concluded that most negli-
gence charges involved knowing conduct pleaded down to negligence or were accompanied by
false statements or other deceptive conduct. Steven P. Solow & Ronald A. Sarachan, Criminal
Negligence Prosecutions Under the Federal Clean Water Act: A Statistical Analysis and an Evalu-
ation of the Impact of Hanousek and Hong, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11153 (2002).
124 Information, United States v. Lynn Plasma, Inc., No. 1:05-cr-00042-MHW (D. Idaho Mar. 3,
2005) (negligent storm water discharges); Information, United States v. Texas Petroleum Inv. Co.,
No. 2:08-CR-00215-KDE-DEK (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2008) (discharge of brine into a wildlife refuge
after pump failed); Information, United States v. Ohio Fresh Eggs, LLC, No. 3:09-mj-07047-VKA
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 16, 2009) (2 defendants charged with the overnight discharge of egg wash waste
water that exceeded permit limits); Information, United States v. Lindsey, No. 6:05-cr-60068-
RTH-MEM (W.D. La. Oct. 13, 2005) (negligent discharge of oil caused by sump pump failure);
Information, United States v. Allen Canning Co., No. 1:07-cr-10004-DDD-JDK (W.D. La. Mar.
16, 2007); Information, United States v. Confluence Consulting Inc., No. 2:10-cr-00019-JCL (D.
Mont. Sep. 2, 2010).
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Clean Water Act Charges
In terms of conduct, the largest category of violations prosecuted under the
CWA was the discharge of pollutants without a permit (131 defendants). The
pollutants involved in such discharge violations may vary widely, because pol-
lutants are defined broadly under the Act.125 But the failure to obtain a permit
cuts to the heart of the CWA regulatory scheme. EPA and the states determine
how much pollution can be tolerated in a given waterway based on a waste-
load allocation that takes into account all sources of pollution and determines
how they must be limited to comply with state water quality standards.126 It is
not possible to make the necessary waste-load determinations if there are dis-
charges that are not disclosed because they occur without a permit.
The next largest category of violations prosecuted under the CWA was
discharge in violation of a permit (93 defendants). Again, the pollutants in-
volved in permit violations could vary widely, but most criminal CWA permit
violation cases involve exceedances that are not disclosed on required dis-
charge monitoring reports. Permit violations therefore undermine the effective-
ness of pollution regulation in much the same way as discharges without a
permit: In both circumstances, water quality standards may not be met because
the regulatory agency does not have complete information about the amount of
pollution that is discharged into the water.
Taken together, CWA permit violations (both discharge without a permit
and discharge in violation of a permit) constitute 73% of CWA criminal prose-
cutions (223 defendants out of 307 defendants). Moreover, illegal discharges
under the CWA also include pretreatment violations (56 defendants) and oil
spills (21 defendants). As a result, nearly every CWA defendant (289 out of 307
defendants) committed some sort of discharge violation — and at least some of
125 The CWA defines pollutants as “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, gar-
bage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat,
wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural
waste discharged into water.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2012).
126 Overview of the Water Quality Standards-to-Permit Process, EPA, http://perma.law.
harvard.edu/0PA1k5xuS97.
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them also made false statements (22 defendants) or tampered with monitoring
methods (14 defendants) to conceal their illegal discharges.127
C. Clean Air Act Charges
The CAA was the second most frequently charged environmental statute,
accounting for 19% of all defendants charged (164 out of 864 defendants).
Historically, the majority of criminal prosecutions under the CAA have in-
volved asbestos violations. Asbestos cases, as noted in Part II, supra, involve
the removal of asbestos or the demolition of buildings containing asbestos
without complying with CAA regulations developed to protect workers and the
general public from exposure to asbestos.128 The cases warrant criminal prose-
cution — they involve a failure to comply with the regulatory scheme in a way
that creates public health risks — and therefore have not been the subject of
over-criminalization claims. Nonetheless, EPA has attempted to shift its focus
from asbestos cases to CAA prosecutions involving larger facilities, such as
refineries and factories, which may have broader public health impacts.
Instead, the overall number of asbestos cases as a percentage of CAA
charges was high across the six years that we analyzed, accounting for 65% of
all CAA charges (106 out of 164 defendants). The number of CAA asbestos
cases also was high as a percentage of all defendants charged, at just over 12%
(106 out of 864 defendants). While there was a downward shift in the number
of asbestos cases during the middle years of our study, as shown in Figure 4, by
the last year the number of asbestos cases had surged.
127 The number of defendants referenced in this paragraph includes those charged with making
false statements and tampering with monitoring methods under the CWA. A total of 51 defendants
made false statements or engaged in obstruction in CWA cases when Title 18 charges are
included.
128 See, e.g., United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 88 (6th Cir. 1991); see also EPA, supra note
126. R
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FIGURE 4. DEFENDANTS CHARGED UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT:





































CAA Charges Asbestos Charges
Unless there has been an increase in renovation and demolition activity in
buildings with asbestos, our data do not show a shift away from asbestos cases.
There was a marked decrease in the number of defendants in one year (between
2006 and 2007), but that decrease corresponded with an overall decrease in
CAA prosecutions that was reversed in the three subsequent years (each of
which saw higher numbers of asbestos prosecutions). Indeed, it is difficult to
see any significant difference in the number of asbestos cases when we com-
pare the first two years of our study (an average of 21 asbestos defendants each
year) with the last two years of our study (an average of 22 defendants per
year).
Non-asbestos CAA charges increased between 2005 and 2010. The first
three years of the study there were 6 or 7 defendants charged each year with
non-asbestos CAA violations. During the last three years of the study, the num-
ber of non-asbestos CAA charges averaged nearly 13 defendants per year, with
sharp increases during two of the three years in question. In the two years when
there was a sharp increase in the number of non-asbestos charges, those defend-
ants accounted for close to 50% of all CAA defendants (50% in 2008 and 46%
in 2010).
Civil enforcement under the CAA long ago moved away from asbestos
cases. The civil enforcement program under the CAA has been dominated for
more than a decade by the power plants and refineries initiatives under the
“new source review” provisions of the CAA, which have brought substantial
reductions in air pollution and related health problems throughout the United
States.129 It is too soon to tell whether a similar shift is occurring for criminal
129 Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, EPA, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0b3Y41qGGex.
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enforcement cases, but it would be a significant development if more CAA
charges were brought for pollution from refineries and factories.
D. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Charges
The number of defendants charged with hazardous waste crimes under
RCRA was relatively consistent in five of the six years covered by our study.
Between 14 and 17 defendants were prosecuted for RCRA violations each year,
with the exception of 2007, when the number surged to 36. Overall, RCRA
violations accounted for nearly 1 in 7 defendants charged between 2005 and
2010.
Perhaps the most significant RCRA data from our study involve the type
of violations that are the subject of criminal prosecution. As noted earlier,
RCRA is a “cradle-to-grave” regulatory scheme, which imposes requirements
on companies that generate, transport, treat, store, and dispose of hazardous
waste.130 Hazardous waste is defined broadly under RCRA,131 and the regula-
tions promulgated under RCRA impose a large number of requirements on in-
dustry, including recordkeeping requirements that enable the government to
track hazardous waste from creation to its ultimate disposal. As a result, RCRA
is frequently cited as an example of the arcane nature of environmental law (a
“regulatory cuckoo land of definitions,” according to a former top-ranking
EPA hazardous waste official)132 and the seeming overbreadth of the criminal
provisions under the environmental laws.133
Yet, despite the breadth and complexity of RCRA’s hazardous waste defi-
nition, the RCRA charges brought from 2005–2010 appeared to be focused on
undeniably hazardous wastes. The nature of the hazardous waste was identified
for 101 of the 117 RCRA defendants in our dataset. Of those 101 defendants,
more than one-third (36 defendants) mishandled ignitable or corrosive hazard-
ous waste. An additional 31 defendants mishandled heavy metals, such as lead
and cadmium, and 26 defendants mishandled solvents, such as toluene and
methyl ethyl ketone, or paint wastes. There were no RCRA charges brought for
the mishandling of wastes where the defendants could have thought in good
faith that the waste was not potentially harmful and therefore subject to
regulation.
Although RCRA’s criminal provisions reach the statute’s myriad record-
keeping and labeling requirements,134 the results of our study show that nearly
all of the defendants charged with crimes under RCRA appeared to be commit-
ting substantive violations of the law. More than half of the defendants charged
with RCRA violations were storing hazardous waste without a permit (65 out
130 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006).
131 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (2012).
132 See United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 882 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (quoting former EPA
Assistant Administrator of Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response Don R. Clay, who also
stated, “I believe we have five people in the Agency who know what ‘hazardous waste’ is”).
133 See Lazarus, supra note 39, at 2471–73. R
134 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2012).
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of 117 defendants, or 56% of all RCRA defendants). More than one-third of the
defendants charged with RCRA violations were disposing of hazardous waste
without a permit (49 out of 117 defendants, or 42% of all RCRA defendants).
Nearly one-quarter of all RCRA defendants were charged with illegal transpor-
tation of hazardous waste (27 out of 117 defendants charged with RCRA viola-
tions, or 23% of all RCRA defendants). As the preceding numbers suggest,
some of those defendants were charged with multiple violations of RCRA’s
storage, disposal, and transportation requirements. Only 5 defendants in our
study were charged with RCRA crimes other than unlawful storage, disposal,
or transportation of hazardous waste. These results are shown in Figure 5.
































The RCRA data therefore may significantly undermine the claims that en-
vironmental crimes are prosecuted for technical violations in obscure areas of
the law. The criminal provisions of RCRA apply broadly and do not distinguish
between recordkeeping requirements and violations that involve directly expos-
ing the public to dangerous waste management practices.135  Yet investigators
and prosecutors, at least during the six-year period covered by our study, lim-
ited criminal prosecution to cases where defendants stored hazardous waste
without a permit, transported hazardous waste to facilities that were not author-
ized to receive it, and disposed of hazardous waste illegally and therefore
unsafely.136
135 Id.
136 For previous studies with similar findings, see Brickey, supra note 79, at 1133–34. R
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E. Vessel Pollution Charges
Curbing vessel pollution has been a Justice Department priority for over a
decade, beginning with a series of successful prosecutions of cruise ship com-
panies in the 1990s and then moving to other sectors of the maritime indus-
try.137 Vessel pollution cases involve bypassing pollution control equipment and
dumping waste, often oily bilge water, overboard. The United States does not
have jurisdiction over vessel pollution, except when it occurs in American wa-
ters or involves ships flying under the American flag.138 But the United States is
the largest port country in the world, and ships that enter American ports must
have operable pollution control equipment as well as accurate records of their
waste management to comply with APPS, which implements the MARPOL
convention.139
In the typical vessel pollution case, the Justice Department charges vessel
companies and their captains and chief engineers with presenting false records
to Coast Guard inspectors and bringing ships into United States ports without
operable oily-water separators and other pollution controls in violation of
APPS.140 APPS charges accounted for more than 10% of all defendants prose-
cuted during the six years covered by our study (89 out of 864 defendants). The
number of defendants charged under APPS was consistent across our data.141
For several years, EPA has expressed a desire to defer to the Coast Guard
on routine vessel pollution cases, since the Coast Guard has primary jurisdic-
tion and individual vessel pollution cases do not typically involve large
amounts of pollution. EPA has expressed a willingness to remain involved in
the larger vessel pollution cases, particularly when the cases involve more sig-
nificant discharges or otherwise cause discernible environmental harm.
Whether or not this occurs, however, vessel pollution will likely remain a prior-
ity for the Justice Department, and APPS violations will continue to be fre-
quently charged environmental crimes.
IV. THE PRESENCE OF INDIVIDUAL AGGRAVATING FACTORS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
In this Part, I provide the results of our efforts to determine whether the
individual aggravating factors I had identified were present in pollution prose-
cutions initiated from 2005–2010. We determined that 96% of the defendants
(828 out of 864 defendants) engaged in conduct involving at least one of the
four aggravating factors. The most prevalent aggravating factors were repetitive
violations (78% or 679 defendants) and deceptive or misleading conduct (63%
137  Vessel Pollution Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ENV’T & NATURAL RESOURCES DIV.,
http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0TyYpy7svPo/.
138 33 U.S.C. § 1902 (2012) (“Prevention of Pollution from Ships”).
139 See, e.g., United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2008).
140 Id.
141 In addition, there were 9 defendants who engaged in similar misconduct (i.e., presenting false
records to Coast Guard inspectors) charged solely under Title 18.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\38-1\HLE104.txt unknown Seq: 36 24-MAR-14 13:45
194 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 38
or 545 defendants). The third most common factor was operating outside the
regulatory scheme (33% or 287 defendants), followed by defendants who
caused significant harm (17% or 144 defendants). These findings are shown in
Figure 6 below:











































These results support two significant conclusions, both of which suggest that
criminal enforcement was reserved for culpable conduct under the environmen-
tal laws from 2005–2010.
First, one or more aggravating factors are present for nearly all defend-
ants prosecuted under the environmental laws. This is a significant finding in
light of over-criminalization claims, since it suggests that criminal enforcement
is reserved for conduct involving the aggravating factors that, under my norma-
tive model, might warrant criminal prosecution. It also may help address ran-
domness claims about criminal enforcement, since it suggests that prosecutorial
discretion may follow a distinctive pattern by focusing on defendants who en-
gage in conduct involving one or more aggravating factors.
Second, it is unlikely that there will be a criminal prosecution if no aggra-
vating factor is present. We identified only a small number of defendants (36)
who engaged in conduct that did not involve one of the aggravating factors.
This finding suggests that prosecutors are unlikely to pursue criminal charges
for violations of the environmental laws that do not involve significant harm,
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deceptive or misleading conduct, facilities operating outside the regulatory sys-
tem, or repetitive violations. It also may help mitigate concerns that prosecutors
are targeting technical violations and defendants who acted in good faith.
In the Sections that follow, I present data and analysis regarding each of
the aggravating factors.142
A. Significant Environmental Harm/Public Health Effects
Cases involving significant environmental harm and public health effects
often receive attention from investigators and prosecutors.143 EPA emphasizes
environmental harm and public health effects in its memorandum to investiga-
tors regarding the proper exercise of investigative discretion.144 Prosecutors also
focus on these cases for a practical reason — they are more compelling for
judges and juries.145 In white collar cases generally and environmental cases in
particular, prosecutors worry that jury nullification may occur if they prove
only the elements of the charged offenses without providing juries with a narra-
tive that allows them to view the conduct as morally culpable.
I have suggested there is risk of prosecutorial overreaching in the context
of significant harm: Outrage over pollution, serious injuries, or deaths can over-
whelm the determination of whether the underlying conduct meets evidentiary
burdens and whether the defendant acted with sufficient culpability to warrant
criminal prosecution.146 Indeed, far from ensuring that defendants are morally
culpable, harm cases could be brought in circumstances where the conduct may
not be intentional but is charged criminally because of the resulting harm. In
addition, there may be some inconsistency in how the government presents
harm cases, such as emphasizing harm to juries when significant harm is pre-
sent, while moving to exclude evidence of no significant environmental harm
when such harm is absent.
Another challenge when analyzing harm cases is the vast range of harms
that may occur. In cases involving significant harm, such as the Exxon Valdez
and Gulf oil spills, the role of harm as a trigger for prosecutorial discretion is
readily apparent.147 In more routine cases, however, harm exists on a wide con-
tinuum. For example, under the Oil Pollution Act, discharges of oil that caused
harm and therefore are potentially criminal would include any discharge that
creates a sheen on the water.  This level of harm is a far cry from the slick the
142 We obtained the same results when we analyzed at the case level: nearly 96% of all cases (635
out of 664 cases) involved at least one of the aggravating factors. We also achieved nearly identi-
cal results when we analyzed the individual aggravating factors at the case level: 17% for signifi-
cant harm; 59% for deceptive or misleading conduct; 33% for operating outside the regulatory
system; and 76% for repetitive violations. We present results here and in Part V based on
defendants.
143 Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1246–48. R
144 Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, supra note 23, at 3–4. R
145 Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1247. R
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1246.
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size of the State of South Carolina observed during the Gulf oil spill.148 Harm to
wildlife can range from the death of a single migratory bird to the thousands
killed in the Exxon Valdez case.149 A similar range of harms can be seen in the
public health context, from the evacuation of a community due to a potential
risk of harm to the serious injuries or deaths that have occurred in the most
notorious environmental prosecutions.150
Our study focused on five types of harm: (1) serious bodily injury or
death; (2) knowing or negligent endangerment; (3) animal deaths; (4) cleanup
costs; and (5) evacuations and emergency responses.151 At least one of these
factors was present for 15% of the defendants in our study (131 of the 864
defendants). Significant environmental harm that did not fit into one of the five
factors listed above was present for an additional 13 defendants. Overall, 17%
of the defendants included in our study (144 of the 864 defendants) were
charged with conduct involving significant environmental harm, a statistically
significant percentage but the smallest of the four aggravating factors analyzed.
These defendants can be further separated into two groups: those whose con-
duct caused environmental harm and those whose conduct caused public health
effects. Environmental harm cases include those that caused animal deaths or
cleanup costs over $100,000; public health cases are those that caused serious
bodily injury or death, knowing or negligent endangerment, or evacuations or
emergency response.
Nearly 60% of the defendants with this aggravating factor caused environ-
mental harm (59% or 86 out of 144 defendants). Of those defendants, 39 en-
gaged in conduct that caused animal mortality and 56 engaged in conduct
resulting in cleanup costs of more than $100,000 (with 9 defendants causing
both animal deaths and significant cleanup costs). Both categories included a
wide spectrum of environmental harm. The animal death cases, for instance,
included a number of incidents where thousands of birds or fish were killed, but
also a number of violations where the deaths were in the single digits. Like-
wise, cleanup costs soared as high as $70 million for the San Francisco Bay oil
spill,152 yet our sample also involved numerous cases where cleanup costs were
between $100,000 and $200,000. It might be possible in future research to dis-
tinguish between types of animal deaths and cleanup costs; for our initial analy-
sis, however, we were constrained by the need to have clear data points that
assured consistent results.
148 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (2012). By regulation, EPA and the Coast Guard have defined harmful
quantities as discharges that cause a “sheen upon . . . the surface of the water or adjoining
shorelines.”
149 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 706 (2012).
150 United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655, 660 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (finding
defendant liable for CAA violations at a Texas refinery that resulted in fifteen deaths);  United
States v. S. Union Co., 630 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 2010) (in which apartment buildings were evacu-
ated due to defendant’s RCRA violations), rev’d on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 2344.
151 Each of these aggravating factors is a specific offense characteristic under the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines. U.S.S.G. §§ 2Q1.2(b), 2Q1.3(b) (2012).
152 Judgment in a Criminal Case at 3, United States v. Fleet Management Ltd., No. 3:08-cr-00160
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2010) (imposing fine of $8 million and community service of $2 million).
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A little more than one-third of the defendants with this aggravating factor
caused public health effects (38% or 54 out of 144 defendants). Approximately
one-ninth of the defendants committed acts or omissions that caused serious
bodily injuries or deaths (12% or 17 out of 144 defendants). More defendants
were charged with knowing or negligent endangerment (15% or 21 out of 144
defendants). A similar number of defendants in this subcategory caused evacu-
ations or emergency responses (15% or 22 out of 144 defendants).
While environmental harm or public health effects factored into the con-
duct of 1 out of every 6 defendants,153 it is noteworthy that no single subcat-
egory of environmental harm or public health effects accounted for even 7% of
all defendants in the overall study. The largest subcategory was substantial
cleanup costs, which included more than 6.5% of all defendants in the study
(56 defendants out of 864). The next largest subcategory was animal deaths,
which involved 4.5% of all defendants (39 defendants out of 864). The smallest
subcategories were serious bodily injuries or deaths, which were caused by just
under 2% of all defendants (17 defendants out of 864), and knowing or negli-
gent endangerment, which was committed by just 2.4% of all defendants (21
defendants out of 864).
On the other hand, while our data suggest that significant harm was caused
by only one-sixth of the criminal defendants, it merits emphasis that we fo-
cused on conduct where harm appeared to be a distinctive “plus” factor in
criminal cases. Most pollution crime involves risk of environmental harm or
public health effects, since those factors are present whenever pollutants and
hazardous wastes are improperly stored, disposed, discharged, or released into
the environment. If we had included all potential contamination cases — for
example, every CWA discharge case, every RCRA storage and disposal case,
and all of the CAA asbestos cases — the harm numbers would have been three
times higher, involving 73% of all defendants (484 out of 664 defendants).
Stated differently, harm or the potential for harm is present in most environ-
mental cases or they would not be violations at all. Our challenge in examining
prosecutorial discretion factors was to identify cases where harm was aggra-
vated and therefore might be a reason the case was criminally prosecuted. It is
in this narrower understanding of harm that the number of cases may be lim-
ited, not in a broader conceptualization.
B. Deceptive or Misleading Conduct
Deceptive or misleading conduct undermines the effectiveness of environ-
mental protection in at least three ways. First, deceptive conduct, such as the
use of bypass lines or midnight dumping, can allow illegal pollution to go un-
detected. Second, the environmental laws largely involve an honor system
153 Other harm was noted by our researchers for 14 defendants out of the 144 defendants who
committed violations that resulted in significant harm. The harms classified as other harms in-
cluded environmental harms (e.g., destruction of habitat and wetlands) and public health effects
(e.g., lead poisoning) that did not fall within one of the enumerated categories.
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where companies must seek permits or other authorization for pollution activi-
ties and then must monitor and self-report their compliance.154 When companies
do not conduct required monitoring or honestly report their pollution activity,
they undermine the self-policing required under the environmental laws. Third,
misleading conduct deprives regulators of accurate information about overall
levels of pollution, which they need to make informed decisions about what
pollution to permit.
I have suggested that lying is the most significant factor in making a crim-
inal case out of what otherwise might be a civil or administrative violation.155 If
this premise is true and a high percentage of criminal cases involve deceptive
or misleading conduct, it could address concerns that law-abiding individuals
are being unfairly targeted with criminal prosecution. I would argue that indi-
viduals who misrepresent facts regarding their compliance with legal require-
ments are not acting in good faith. Moreover, all corporations and individuals
are expected to be honest in their statements and submissions to the govern-
ment. False statements, concealment, and obstruction of justice are therefore
criminal under both the environmental laws and Title 18 of the United States
Code.156
Over 60% of the defendants included in our study committed violations
involving deceptive or misleading conduct (63%, or 544 of 864 defendants).
This finding is significant because it suggests that the majority of those charged
as environmental criminals engage in conduct that is viewed as culpable in
other areas of the criminal law as well. To better understand this factor, we
analyzed deceptive or misleading conduct based on whether it occurred during
(1) the commission of the underlying offense (e.g., by using a bypass line to
circumvent pollution control equipment), (2) reporting or recordkeeping (e.g.,
falsifying documents to conceal pollution control activity), or (3) a cover-up
after the violations occurred (e.g., lying to investigators and destroying evi-
dence of a crime).
More than 36% of the defendants in our study (313 of 864 defendants)
engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct in the commission of their viola-
tions. Nearly 39% of the defendants in our study (336 of 864 defendants) en-
gaged in deceptive or misleading conduct when submitting required reports of
pollution activity or in maintaining required compliance records. More than
24% of the defendants (209 of 864 defendants) engaged in some type of after-
the-fact effort to conceal violations from regulators.
154 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(1)(A) (2012).
155 Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1249. R
156 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (false statements); id. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512, 1515, 1519 (obstruction
of justice).
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Perhaps as significantly, nearly half of the defendants engaging in decep-
tive or misleading conduct did so in multiple ways. Of the 544 defendants who
engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct, 106 defendants were involved
solely in deception during the commission of the offense, 123 defendants were
involved in deception solely during reporting or recordkeeping, and 80 defend-
ants were engaged in deceptive conduct solely during cover-up activity. The
remaining 236 defendants, or 43%, were engaged in two or more types of de-
ceptive activity.
The presence of multiple forms of deceptive or misleading conduct is even
more striking when each of the subcategories is examined separately. Of the
313 defendants who engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct during the
commission of the offense, 66% also engaged in reporting/recordkeeping viola-
tions, cover-up activity, or both. Similarly, of the 336 defendants who engaged
in reporting or recordkeeping violations, 63% also committed deceptive or mis-
leading conduct during the commission of the offense, during the cover-up, or
during both. Of the 209 defendants who engaged in some sort of cover-up ac-
tivity, 62% also engaged in other forms of deceptive or misleading conduct.
Given the highly technical nature of environmental compliance, prosecu-
tors should focus on conduct that involves the intent to mislead or deceive, and
not merely confusion or mistake. Our analysis is based on charging documents
prepared by the government, but it is significant that over 60% of the defend-
ants in our study engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct — and that most
of those defendants were dishonest in multiple ways, which tends to undermine
claims that their deception was isolated or overstated by the government.
Deceptive or misleading conduct inculpates both for its own sake — both
law and ethics demand that we be truthful — and because of what it reveals
about the mental state of the majority of criminal defendants in environmental
cases. It has long been argued that the complexity of the environmental laws
lays a trap for the uninformed, and that reduced mental state requirements com-
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pound the problem by criminalizing conduct that defendants had no idea was
unlawful, let alone criminal. Our study’s findings concerning the prevalence of
deceptive or misleading conduct do not mean that the environmental laws are
not complex, or that their criminal provisions are not far reaching. The fact that
so many of the defendants charged as environmental criminals engaged in de-
ceptive or misleading conduct, however, may undercut the argument that the
government is prosecuting individuals who make good faith efforts to comply
and do not engage in any culpable behavior.
C. Operating Outside the Regulatory System
The third factor that I have argued may warrant criminal enforcement in-
volves companies that operate outside the regulatory scheme.157 Like many
modern statutory schemes, the environmental laws impose substantial regula-
tory requirements on facilities across the United States. It is no longer credible
for companies to claim ignorance of the fact that their conduct may be regu-
lated. Companies that participate in the regulatory system do so at substantial
cost and should not be at a competitive disadvantage when compared to compa-
nies that fail to meet their legal obligations. In addition, as noted earlier, the
government depends upon complete and accurate information about pollution
activity in order to operate an effective permitting system. When companies fail
to participate in the regulatory system, the government has no mechanism for
taking into account their pollution activity, leading to a lack of information that
could undermine environmental protection efforts.
Whether such behavior warrants criminal enforcement, of course, is a sep-
arate question from whether the government must take enforcement action to
promote compliance efforts. In some instances, criminal enforcement may be
appropriate.158 If a company transports hazardous waste to facilities that are not
permitted to receive it, for example, there is a significant potential that the
waste will be stored unsafely or disposed of illegally. Likewise, if a company
stores or disposes of hazardous waste without a permit, there is a correspond-
ingly significant risk that the public may be exposed to harmful hazardous
waste and that toxic pollutants will contaminate the environment. Conversely,
civil or administrative enforcement may be more appropriate when the failure
to operate within the regulatory system involves notification or recordkeeping
requirements or if there is evidence that a defendant failed to comply with
permitting requirements because of a good-faith misunderstanding about
whether its activities were regulated.159
157 Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1249–50. R
158 Id. at 1249.
159 As noted in Part I, supra, the government is not required to show that defendants in environ-
mental cases know their conduct is unlawful; mistake of law is not a defense. It is possible,
however, that a company might in good faith mistakenly believe that its conduct is not regulated.
How the government exercises its prosecutorial discretion in those circumstances will depend
upon a range of factors, including the complexity of the underlying regulatory requirements, the
size and sophistication of the company involved, and the extent to which the company has made a
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Nearly one-third of the defendants charged with environmental crimes op-
erated outside the regulatory system (33% or 287 out of 864 defendants). Of
those 287 defendants, 85% failed to obtain permits required under the environ-
mental laws or transported hazardous wastes to facilities that were not permit-
ted to receive hazardous waste. Slightly less than 15% of defendants who
operated outside the regulatory system failed to maintain required records;
5.6% of those defendants failed to monitor for pollution activity, and 30%
failed to report pollution.




































Significantly, most defendants charged with failure to maintain records,
failure to monitor, or failure to report also committed another subcategory of
violation. Only one defendant over the six-year period covered by the study
was charged solely with recordkeeping violations, and only three defendants
were charged solely with failure to monitor violations. The numbers were
higher for failure to report pollution activity, including 18 defendants or ap-
proximately 2% of all defendants charged with environmental crime. In con-
trast, there were 184 defendants charged solely with either failure to obtain a
permit or permit violations, accounting for 21% of all defendants.
The overwhelming number of defendants charged with permit violations
— both alone and in combination with other acts properly characterized as
good-faith effort to meet its legal obligations and has been forthright with regulatory officials. The
government may choose not to prosecute criminally when the defendants are unsophisticated
mom-and-pop companies that do not normally engage in regulated activity. The government has
not fared well in Supreme Court cases involving less sophisticated defendants. See, e.g., Sackett v.
EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012) (administrative enforcement).
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operating outside the regulatory system — suggests that prosecutors have exer-
cised their discretion to focus on the type of actions that most undermine the
regulatory system and generally do not prosecute when the violations are more
technical. These results are consistent with the analysis of RCRA charges pro-
vided in Part III, supra, where the overwhelming majority of RCRA charges
involved transportation, storage, and disposal violations, which create the great-
est public health and environmental risk.
D. Repetitive Violations
The fourth category of cases that I have asserted might be appropriate for
criminal prosecution is repetitive violations. On a number of occasions during
my time at the Justice Department, we considered for criminal prosecution fa-
cilities that had failed to comply with the law notwithstanding years of efforts
by regulators to promote compliance — and, at least in some cases, prior ad-
ministrative or civil enforcement actions.160 I reasoned that “when violations
persist despite the efforts of the regulatory agency to ensure compliance, repeti-
tive violators may become appropriate targets for enforcement, including crimi-
nal prosecution.”161 Based on my experience, I thought this would be a small
but significant subset of criminal prosecutions.
In fact, it was difficult to identify facilities that had been the subject of
prior enforcement action in our research. Indictments and information only
rarely reference prior violations. Evidence of such “prior bad acts” is admitted
only under limited circumstances (e.g., where necessary to prove intent, lack of
mistake, or common plan and scheme).162
We therefore focused on the duration of the charged misconduct and of
any other relevant conduct to identify the extent to which criminal charges were
based on repetitive violations. We reasoned that repetitive violations would be
viewed differently by prosecutors than isolated occurrences of misconduct, par-
ticularly those that took place on a single day. We considered two types of
repetitive violations to be potentially aggravating: first, single violations that
were egregious enough that they continued for multiple days, weeks, months,
or years; and, second, multiple violations that occurred over a period of days,
weeks, months, or years.
More than three-quarters of the defendants in our database committed vio-
lations that lasted more than one day (79% or 679 out of 864 defendants). We
then sorted to determine how many of those defendants committed violations
that either lasted more than one week, more than one month, or more than one
year or that had harmful effects over a comparable period of time. We found
160 See, e.g., United States v. Cent. Indus., Inc., No. 3:99-cv-00540 (S.D. Miss. 2000); United
States v. Central Industries, Inc. (S.D. Miss.), DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0uor
DgBoVB1 (from April through July 1995, the company committed approximately 1114 permit
violations, exceeding the pollutant limitations set forth in the company’s permit by hundreds of
percentage points and its permitted flow rate by millions of gallons).
161 Uhlmann, supra note 9, at 1250 n.137 (citation omitted). R
162
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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that the largest number of defendants who engaged in repetitive conduct com-
mitted violations that lasted more than one year (41% or 351 defendants who
engaged in repetitive violations). The results for duration of violations are sum-
marized in Figure 9 below:
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1 day
















These findings admit to competing interpretations about the significance
of repetitive violations. On the one hand, as noted above, more than three-
quarters of the defendants committed violations that lasted more than one day.
Of that group, 84% committed violations that lasted more than one month and
52% committed violations that lasted more than one year. Those findings sug-
gest that duration is often an aggravating factor in environmental criminal pros-
ecutions — and that most defendants commit violations over a period of
months or years.
On the other hand, more than a fifth of defendants (21%) committed viola-
tions that occurred on a single day. Indeed, just over one-quarter of all defend-
ants (27%) committed violations that did not last more than one week. Those
findings suggest that, while environmental criminal cases most often involve
violations lasting a month or longer, a significant percentage of cases involve
violations of relatively limited duration.
We examined the single-day defendants more closely to determine
whether factors were present that might explain why isolated misconduct re-
sulted in criminal charges. We determined that 80% of the defendants engaged
in misconduct that involved at least one of the other aggravating factors, with
50% of the defendants engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct. The pres-
ence of those aggravating factors might be sufficient to justify criminal prose-
cution. Moreover, the fact that charges are focused on a single day does not
mean that the misconduct was limited to a single day: Prosecutors may have
agreed to charge a single day of violation as part of a plea agreement. Nonethe-
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less, cases involving isolated misconduct merit caution: An isolated violation
should be more egregious to warrant criminal enforcement.163
V. ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGGRAVATING FACTORS AND
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
In this Part, I analyze the data regarding the presence of aggravating fac-
tors in environmental prosecutions from three perspectives. First, I analyze how
often multiple aggravating factors were present in the dataset and whether there
appears to be any relationships among the factors. Second, I consider whether
particular factors are present more or less often depending upon the charges
selected by the prosecutor. Third, I examine cases with no aggravating factors
to determine whether they reveal marginal cases.
A. Multiple Aggravating Factors and the Relationships Between
Aggravating Factors
As Part IV explained, aggravating factors were present for 96% of the
defendants in our six-year dataset (828 out of 864 defendants). To better under-
stand the role of these aggravating factors, I also analyzed how often multiple
factors were present and considered the relationship between factors.164 Two or
more aggravating factors were present for 74% of the defendants (638 out of
864 defendants). The fact that such a high percentage of defendants had multi-
ple aggravating factors suggests a higher level of egregiousness than would be
present if most defendants had only a single aggravating factor. Our data re-
garding the number of aggravating factors are presented in Figure 10:
163 There were 36 defendants who did not commit repetitive violations who also did not engage in
conduct involving any of the other aggravating factors. The charges for these defendants fall
outside my normative model. I analyze them in Part V, Section C infra, to determine whether or
not they appear to be marginal cases for criminal prosecution.
164 I concluded that the analysis provided in this Part could be presented effectively without the
inclusion of more sophisticated statistical models, such as regression and correlation analysis.
When we analyzed our data using regression and correlation models, we obtained similar results
but the outcomes did not enhance our understanding of the relationships between the aggravating
factors.
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An analysis of these data supports three additional findings regarding the ag-
gravating factors in environmental crimes.
First, one of the first three factors (all factors other than repetitiveness)
was present for 88% of the defendants (761 out of 864 defendants). In other
words, most defendants were charged for violations that involved harm, decep-
tive or misleading conduct, or operating outside the regulatory scheme. These
findings may suggest a further refinement of my overall conclusions from Part
IV, supra: (1) In most instances, prosecutors reserve criminal prosecution for
defendants with one of the first three aggravating factors; and (2) defendants
who engage in conduct that does not involve one of the first three factors are
unlikely to face criminal charges.
Second, repetitiveness often is present when criminal charges are brought
but rarely is the sole aggravating factor. Repetitiveness was the most prevalent
of the four factors, accounting for 79% of the defendants (679 out of 864 de-
fendants). Repetitiveness was the sole aggravating factor, however, for only
10% of the defendants who committed repetitive violations (67 out of 679 de-
fendants), which is the lowest for any aggravating factor.165 Stated differently,
90% of the defendants who committed repetitive violations (612 out of 679
defendants) also had at least one other aggravating factor. These findings sug-
gest that, while prosecutors may prefer to charge repetitive violations, repeti-
tiveness alone may not be driving charging decisions.
Third, more than 71% of defendants (612 out of 864 defendants) engaged
in conduct that involved one of the first three factors (significant harm, decep-
tive conduct, operating outside the regulatory system) and repetitiveness. Since
165 Operating outside the regulatory system is the sole aggravating factor in only 11% of the cases
where it is present (30 out of 281 defendants). In contrast, deceptive or misleading conduct is the
sole aggravating factor for 36% of the defendants who engaged in deceptive or misleading con-
duct (136 out of 547 defendants).
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most environmental crimes involve one of the first three aggravating factors
(88% of all defendants) and most environmental crimes involve repetitive vio-
lations (79% of all defendants), we would expect to see one of the first three
factors present along with repetitiveness in a high percentage of cases. But the
relationship was even stronger when we looked at multi-factor defendants. Re-
petitiveness was present for 96% of the defendants with two or more aggravat-
ing factors (612 out of 638 defendants).166 For defendants with two factors,
repetitiveness was present for 94% of the defendants (443 out of 469 defend-
ants).167 The pairing of repetitiveness with one or more of the other aggravating
factors was the most dominant multi-factor relationship when calculated as a
percentage of all defendants (71% of all defendants).168 This finding suggests
that prosecutors often reserve criminal prosecution for violations that involve
both one of the first three factors and repetitiveness and are less likely to bring
criminal charges if that relationship is absent.
We found evidence of other relationships among the aggravating factors.
Deceptive or misleading conduct occurred least frequently in combination with
the factors of significant harm and operating outside the regulatory system. We
found 545 defendants who engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct; only
11% of those defendants (58 defendants) engaged in conduct that resulted in
significant harm. In other words, significant harm was present as a percentage
of defendants involved in deceptive or misleading conduct less frequently than
in our dataset as a whole (17% of all defendants). More of the defendants who
engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct were operating outside the regula-
tory system (21% or 117 defendants) but a relatively modest amount overall
and, as with harm, less often than in our dataset as a whole (where it was
present for 33% of all defendants).
Deceptive or misleading conduct was present as the sole aggravating fac-
tor more often than it was paired with significant harm. Deceptive or mislead-
ing conduct was the sole aggravating factor for 14% of the defendants who
engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct (78 out of 545 defendants). For
defendants who had only one aggravating factor, deceptive or misleading con-
duct appeared more often than any other aggravating factor both in raw num-
bers (the next largest category was repetitive violations, which was the sole
aggravating factor for 67 defendants) and as a percentage of defendants pos-
sessing that factor (the next largest category was significant harm at 11% of all
significant harm defendants). As with other aggravating factors, most defend-
ants who engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct also committed repetitive
166 The results are even higher when calculated by case: Repetitiveness is present in 93% of cases
with more than one factor (396 out of 424).
167 Of course, most defendants in our dataset committed repetitive violations, so I would expect to
see a significant overlap between repetitive violations and other factors. Still, it is revealing that
the other three factors were present so often and that repetitiveness appeared by itself so
infrequently.
168 The combination of one of the first three factors and repetitiveness also is the most dominant
relationship as a percentage of all cases, accounting for 68% of all cases in the dataset (450 out of
664 cases).
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violations (83% or 452 out of 545 defendants), which suggests that deceptive or
misleading conduct is charged most often when it occurs more than once. It
merits emphasis, though, that deceptive and misleading conduct was charged
most often as a standalone factor — and appeared the most often of the first
three aggravating factors. As noted previously, in my experience, deceptive or
misleading conduct is the most significant factor in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.
Conversely, we found at least some positive relationship between signifi-
cant harm and operating outside the regulatory system. There were 60 defend-
ants who engaged in conduct that involved both significant harm and operating
outside the regulatory system. As a result, 41% of all significant harm defend-
ants were also operating outside the regulatory system, which is a higher per-
centage than in the dataset as a whole (33% of all defendants were operating
outside the regulatory system). Similarly, 21% of defendants operating outside
the regulatory system also caused significant harm, which is a higher percent-
age than in the dataset as a whole (17% of all defendants caused significant
harm). The correlation may not be particularly strong but even a modest corre-
lation between significant harm and operating outside the regulatory system
would be noteworthy, since a primary purpose of the regulatory system is to
protect public health and the environment from harm (or the risk of harm).
B. Aggravating Factors Based on Statute Charged
We also analyzed the extent to which the presence of aggravating factors
appeared to vary based on the statutes charged. Here, again, the overwhelming
majority of charges brought were for conduct involving one or more of the
aggravating factors. As discussed in Part III, supra, environmental crime is
charged most often under Title 18, CWA, CAA, RCRA, and APPS. For viola-
tions charged under those statutes, aggravating factors were present for be-
tween 94% and 99.7% of all defendants, compared to the national mean of 96%
of all defendants. These findings are summarized in Figure 11 below:
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1+ Factors No Factor
99.7% 94% 98% 95% 99%
Aggravating factors were present most often, as a percentage of all de-
fendants, for violations charged under Title 18 (99.7% of all defendants
charged under the statute). In fact, we identified only one prosecution under
Title 18 that did not involve the presence of one aggravating factor, even
though Title 18 charges were brought against 376 defendants, the largest num-
ber of defendants in the six-year period covered by my research. The only case
brought under Title 18 that did not involve at least one aggravating factor was a
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1361 for the destruction of government prop-
erty.169 These findings demonstrate that Title 18 charges for environmental
crime are virtually certain to include one or more of the aggravating factors
analyzed in our study.
Aggravating factors were present least often as a percentage of defendants
charged for violations under the CWA but still constituted 94% of all defend-
ants charged under the Act. There were only 17 defendants charged with CWA
violations where none of our aggravating factors were present. Of those 17
defendants, 11 engaged in negligent violations of the CWA, while 6 engaged in
knowing violations of the Act. The number of defendants charged with negli-
gent violations in the absence of any aggravating factors underscores the need
for caution in charging negligence cases.170 Nonetheless, 91% of all defendants
charged with negligent violations of the CWA, which are misdemeanors, en-
gaged in conduct that involved an aggravating factor. For the more serious
169 Information, United States v. Billings, No. 3:05-cr-01136-JAH (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2005).
170 See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.
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knowing (and felony) violations of the Act, 97% of defendants charged en-
gaged in conduct that involved an aggravating factor, exceeding the mean for
all defendants.
We also analyzed the individual aggravating factors to determine whether
there was any relationship between the statutes charged and the presence of
particular aggravating factors. We saw all aggravating factors present for each
of the statutes but there were variances from the mean for all defendants when
we analyzed by statute. As discussed below, the greatest variations involved the
percentage of defendants by statute who engaged in deceptive or misleading
conduct and the percentage of defendants by statute that were operating outside
the regulatory system.
For significant environmental harm or public health effects, the results
ranged from a low of 4.5% for defendants charged under APPS to a high of
29% for defendants charged under RCRA. The results are summarized in Fig-
ure 12:
FIGURE 12. FREQUENCY OF SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL HARM OR PUBLIC
HEALTH EFFECTS BY STATUTE CHARGED































Significant Harm No Significant Harm
11% 12% 18% 29% 4.5%
These results were predictable for two reasons. First, most APPS viola-
tions involve the failure to maintain an accurate oil record book that documents
the proper management of oily waste generated by ships. The resulting pollu-
tion may cause substantial environmental harm in the aggregate. But, with the
exception of oil spill cases (typically prosecuted under the CWA), the environ-
mental impact of individual vessel cases typically is not known. Second, RCRA
cases involve the failure to properly manage hazardous wastes, which creates
significant risk of harm. Congress defined hazardous waste as solid waste that
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causes increased mortality, irreversible or incapacitating illness, or poses a
“substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment
when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed. . . .”171 As noted in
Part III, supra, the majority of RCRA cases occur when a company stores or
disposes of hazardous waste improperly (e.g., without a permit).
For deceptive or misleading conduct, statutory analysis produced the
greatest variance for any of the aggravating factors. The results ranged from a
low of 39% for defendants charged under RCRA to 91% for defendants
charged under APPS and 93% for defendants charged under Title 18. The na-
tional mean for deceptive or misleading conduct is 63%. These results are sum-
marized below:





































Deceptive Conduct No Deceptive Conduct
93% 50% 70% 39% 91%
Title 18 violations typically involve deceptive or misleading conduct, be-
cause the Title 18 violations charged in environmental cases — with the excep-
tion of conspiracy — include statutory elements that involve deceptive or
misleading conduct.172 Given the frequency of conspiracy charges in environ-
mental crimes, however, which do not include deceptive or misleading conduct
as an element, the percentage of Title 18 defendants with this aggravating fac-
tor (93%) is higher than might be expected (present for all but 27 of the Title 18
defendants). This finding suggests that prosecutors may be emphasizing decep-
tive or misleading conduct in Title 18 matters.
171 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5).
172 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (criminalizing false statements).
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The result for RCRA defendants is not surprising by itself: RCRA cases,
as noted above, typically involve the failure to obtain required permits but not
necessarily deceptive or misleading conduct. In other words, it is possible to
violate RCRA without engaging in deceptive or misleading conduct. Yet the
same is true about CWA and CAA violations, which involved deceptive or
misleading conduct more frequently. Perhaps the disparity reflects the fact that
RCRA violations involve the improper management of hazardous waste, which
could pose more significant public-health and environmental risks than CWA
violations. In addition, the cradle-to-grave regulatory scheme of RCRA may
lend itself to criminal enforcement more readily than the CAA regulatory sys-
tem, which is subject to conflicting interpretations about its requirements.
These issues may warrant further study.
Operating outside the regulatory system also produced a wide range of
variations when analyzed by statute. The results showed a low of 15% for
APPS and a high of 73% for RCRA, with all other statutes close to the national
mean of 33%. Figure 14 summarizes the results:

































Outside the Regulatory System Not Outside the System
27% 32% 36% 67% 15%
The high percentage of RCRA cases — more than twice the mean —
makes sense given the percentage of RCRA cases that involve the failure to
obtain permits to store or dispose of hazardous waste. It is unusual for RCRA
cases to involve permit violations — in other words, misconduct by facilities
that are otherwise participating in the regulatory system. Unlike other permit
violation cases, which require knowledge only of the underlying conduct,
RCRA permit violation cases require knowledge that the conduct is unlawful
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under the permit. Perhaps as a result, there are few RCRA permit violation
cases. It also is logical that APPS violations generally do not involve operating
outside the regulatory system, because most vessel pollution (and resulting
APPS violations) occurs on the high seas, where few ships sail under the flag of
the United States.
The results for repetitive violations showed less variation by statute than
deceptive or misleading conduct and operating outside the regulatory system.
The outcomes ranged from 65% of defendants charged with APPS violations to
92% of defendants charged under the CAA, with a national mean of 79%. The
results are summarized in Figure 15:





































85% 79% 92% 82% 65%
It may be significant that repetitive violations were present least often in
APPS prosecutions, the same pattern that our data showed for significant harm
and operating outside the regulatory system. Of course, APPS cases focus on
deceptive or misleading conduct (the failure to maintain accurate oil record
books on vessels), but the data suggest that prosecutors may be more willing to
bring charges for a single incident in the APPS context than for other statutes.
Perhaps this willingness reflects a view that APPS cases conceal multiple acts
of unlawful pollution activity in violation of MARPOL. Or it may reflect a
more hard-line approach to vessel cases, although since nearly two-thirds of the
vessel cases involve multiple port visits with inaccurate oil record books, there
is a limit to how much these data reveal.
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C. Defendants with No Aggravating Factors Present
For 36 of the defendants in our dataset, we determined that none of the
four aggravating factors was present. We examined each case individually to
determine whether, based on the conduct described in the court documents, any
involved questionable exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Of the 36 defendants with no aggravating factors, 17 defendants commit-
ted violations that, while insufficient to code as “operating outside the regula-
tory system,” nonetheless involved core subcategory violations such as failing
to obtain a permit. For example, in nearly all of the RCRA cases in the
database, the defendants engaged in conduct that at least involved failing to
acquire the requisite permit, which is a subset of culpability under operating
outside the regulatory system. However, not all of those defendants were coded
as operating outside the regulatory system because they might have been par-
tially operating within the regulatory system.
Perhaps there might be circumstances where the failure to obtain a permit
reflected good-faith misunderstanding of the permitting requirement or, in the
RCRA context, the definition of hazardous waste. In those circumstances, pros-
ecutors might choose to exercise their discretion to decline prosecution in favor
of civil or administrative enforcement. By itself, however, there is nothing
about prosecution for failure to obtain regulatory permits that signals
prosecutorial overreaching. The obligation to acquire and maintain valid per-
mits for pollution activity or to store and dispose of hazardous waste is not an
arcane or obscure regulatory requirement.
Only 19 defendants engaged in conduct that was not captured by any cate-
gory or subcategory. We analyzed each of these cases and found that research-
ers had noted explanatory “additional aggravating factors” that may have
influenced prosecutors for 6 defendants. For example, one prosecution involved
safety violations occurring in schools, which may have prompted the prosecu-
tor to pursue criminal charges.173 Another prosecution involved conduct that
appeared to blatantly disregard the law but was not captured by one of the
aggravating factors.174
As a result, most prosecutions with no aggravating factors involved either
a subcategory of operating outside the regulatory system or an additional aggra-
vating factor. Only 13 defendants engaged in conduct where prosecution could
not be justified by a subcategory or additional aggravating factor. Of that num-
ber, 9 defendants were charged in an indictment or information that merely
recited the elements of the offense. It is far easier to identify aggravating fac-
173 See Information at 1, United States v. Lazic, No. 2:07-cr-00324-JS (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2007)
(concerning an asbestos remediation in an elementary school).
174 In United States v. Carman Chemicals, a chemical manufacturer, among its 68 violations, was
found selling products that had been illegal for nearly two decades. Information at 1-2, 2-3, 7-9,
United States v. Carman Chem., Inc., No. 4:06-cr-00683-FRB (E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 2006). Addi-
tional aggravating factors for the remaining defendants included harmful contact with humans,
pollution in pristine environments or protected habitats, and knowing violations by environmental
professionals.
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tors in so-called speaking indictments, where prosecutors provided additional
details about the misconduct, including the type of evidence that fit within the
aggravating factor analysis.
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, only the ele-
ments of the offense must be included in an indictment,175 and pleading prac-
tices vary from district to district. In the absence of speaking indictments, we
looked to other documents to determine whether aggravating factors were pre-
sent (e.g., plea agreements, factual basis statements, sentencing memoranda,
and judgments) but those documents sometimes did not exist or did not provide
additional information beyond the charges.176 Perhaps some of the 9 defendants
who were charged in “bare-bones” indictments or informations did not engage
in conduct that involved any aggravating factors. If so, those could be marginal
criminal cases; we cannot tell from the court documents. Other than those 9
defendants, however, there are only 4 defendants for whom we could not dis-
cern a rationale for the prosecution despite the availability of court documents
that provided details about their misconduct.177 Those 4 defendants were
charged with negligence on a single day, which I previously noted may involve
conduct where civil charges may be more appropriate.178 Nonetheless, 4 de-
fendants is an extremely small percentage of the 864 defendants in our
database.
CONCLUSION
More than three decades after EPA hired its first criminal investigators, the
prosecution of environmental crime remains the source of persistent claims
about over-criminalization and lingering questions about the role of criminal
enforcement under the environmental laws. Given the broad discretion that
prosecutors have under the environmental laws — and the erosion of bi-parti-
san support for environmental protection — those expressions of concern are
not surprising. But they point to the need for a stronger normative framework
and a better empirical understanding of criminal enforcement.
I previously offered a normative model positing that criminal prosecution
would be most appropriate when one or more aggravating factors was present:
significant environmental harm or public health effects, deceptive or mislead-
ing conduct, operating outside the regulatory system, and repetitive violations.
My empirical research now strongly suggests that criminal enforcement has
been limited in most instances to violations involving one or more of those
175
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
176 See, e.g., Information at 1, United States v. Pitts, 4:10-mj-01014-DAS (N.D. Miss. June 21,
2010) (information three lines long, containing date, district, statute violation, and an assertion of
knowledge).
177 See Bill of Information, United States v. Allen Canning Co., 1:07-cr-10004-DDD-JDK (W.D.
La. Mar. 16, 2007) (prosecution against a company for a single incident of discharging vegetable
peel wastewater that included pollutants above permit levels).
178 See supra note 124. The other 3 defendants identified in note 124 were coded for a sub-factor R
of operating outside the regulatory system or for an additional aggravating factor.
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aggravating factors. In 96% of the environmental prosecutions from
2005–2010, at least one aggravating factor was present. In more than 88% of
those environmental prosecutions, the defendants caused significant harm, en-
gaged in deceptive or misleading conduct, or operated outside the regulatory
system that protects the environment and public health. In nearly three-quarters
of the cases, two or more aggravating factors were present, with repetitiveness
most often the additional aggravating factor. These findings suggest that prose-
cutors have reserved criminal enforcement for egregious misconduct.
Moreover, the extent to which environmental criminals engage in decep-
tive and misleading conduct — more than 63% of those prosecuted from
2005–2010 — may undermine claims that environmental defendants are well-
intentioned individuals inadvertently snared by complex regulations and a
criminal enforcement scheme with reduced mental state requirements. The en-
vironmental regulatory system depends upon honest self-reporting; those who
lie to conceal violations are engaging in culpable behavior that cripples efforts
to protect the environment and the public from the risks associated with unlaw-
ful pollution. These findings take on added significance because one-third of
the defendants in our study were operating entirely outside the regulatory
scheme, making no effort to comply with the law. Criminal enforcement is
appropriate for defendants who deceive or seek to operate outside the law, par-
ticularly when their conduct risks or causes significant harm to the environment
and public health.
There were some cautionary notes revealed by our study: 4% of the de-
fendants engaged in conduct that involved no aggravating factors, and a num-
ber of those defendants were charged in what appear to be pure negligence
cases. Cases without aggravating factors and those involving pure negligence
should receive extra scrutiny from prosecutors to ensure that criminal prosecu-
tion is appropriate. In addition, approximately one-fifth of all defendants en-
gaged in conduct that occurred on a single day. Of course, a violation on a
single day could be egregious enough to warrant criminal prosecution; in most
single-day matters, an aggravating factor other than repetitiveness was present.
Nonetheless, the most compelling prosecutions typically involve repeated mis-
conduct, which compounds the wrongdoing and limits any doubt about the de-
fendant’s intent.
Overall, my research should reduce uncertainty about which environmen-
tal violations may result in criminal prosecution and quiet concerns about over-
criminalization. Prosecutors appear to be focusing on conduct that involves the
aggravating factors that I have identified: When those factors are absent, crimi-
nal prosecution is unlikely to occur. Prosecutors thus have reserved criminal
prosecution for culpable conduct and avoided charges based on technical viola-
tions or when defendants acted in good faith. Perhaps most importantly, the
empirical evidence suggests that prosecutors have properly exercised their
broad discretion under the environmental laws and assured an appropriate role
for criminal enforcement in our environmental protection system.
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APPENDIX A: PARTICIPATING MICHIGAN LAW STUDENTS,
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